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STARE DECISIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
Jonathan F. Mitchell*
Almost everyone acknowledges that stare decisis should play a significant
role when the Supreme Court of the United States resolves constitutional
cases. Yet the academic and judicial rationales for this practice tend to rely
on naked consequentialist considerations, and make only passing efforts to
square the Court's stare decisis doctrines with the language of the Consti-
tution. This Article offers a qualified defense of constitutional stare decisis
that rests exclusively on constitutional text. It aims to broaden the overlap-
ping consensus of interpretive theories that can support a role for
constitutional stare decisis, but to do this it must narrow the circumstances
in which stare decisis can be applied.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of stare decisis allows the Supreme Court to uphold laws
that violate the Constitution and invalidate laws that don't. It is not clear
how that practice can be reconciled with the written Constitution, a docu-
ment that the justices are bound by oath to uphold.
To be sure, many have offered pragmatic defenses of constitutional stare
decisis. The themes are familiar: it promotes stability,' protects reliance in-
terests,2 constrains judicial discretion,3 and reduces the decision costs of
resolving constitutional cases.4 But all of these rationales rest on a contro-
versial premise: that good consequences suffice to justify a judicial practice
or doctrine. The Supreme Court, however, derives its legitimacy from the
authority of the written Constitution, and to maintain a plausible claim to
obedience, the Court must ensure that its rulings comport with the document
that confers its power to decide cases. Yet few even attempt to supply a tex-
tual justification for a doctrine that permits the Supreme Court to enforce an
unconstitutional statute, or subordinate a constitutional one to its previously
decided rulings. Even the most thoroughgoing textualists confess that they
use stare decisis as a "pragmatic exception"5 to their obligation to follow the
enacted constitutional language, a concession to consequentialist considera-
tions so strong that they trump even fidelity to the written document.6
This Article will advance a legalistic defense of constitutional stare deci-
sis, a theory of precedent that rests on the written words of the Constitution
rather than the consequentialist rationales that are all too often invoked as
the exclusive justification for its use. At first blush, this project may sound
like a contradiction in terms. It often seems that the very purpose of stare
decisis is to produce outcomes that depart from faithful interpretation of the
Constitution-all because an earlier court decision had misconstrued the
1. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 749-52 (1988).
2. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005).
4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 145 (2008).
5. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 140 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
6. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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(supposedly) supreme law of the land.7 Yet this Article will demonstrate that
the justices may-in limited situations-use wrongly decided constitutional
precedents as rules of decision without betraying their allegiance to the en-
acted constitutional text. One can accommodate a limited role for stare
decisis without surrendering wholesale to judicial pragmatism, or sacrificing
textualist interpretive commitments to consequentialist override.
It is crucial to clarify at the outset the limits of this claim. First, this Ar-
ticle considers only a narrow slice of stare decisis: the cases in which the
Supreme Court uses its own precedents as rules of decision in constitutional
litigation. It makes no claims regarding an inferior court's obligation to fol-
low the Supreme Court's decisions,8 nor will it consider stare decisis in
common law or statutory construction. Second, and more importantly, this
Article takes no sides on whether the justices should invoke stare decisis in
cases where the Constitution permits them to use it. There is a great distance
between defending the constitutionality of a practice and defending its use;
although this Article concludes that the Constitution allowed the justices to
rely on stare decisis in controversial cases such as Gonzales v. Raich,9 it will
maintain strict neutrality on whether the justices' decisions in those cases
were prudent or proper. It seeks only to acquit some of the Court's stare de-
cisis practices of the charges of unconstitutionality that textualist
commentators have leveled against them, and provide a theory of stare deci-
sis that enables textualists and originalists, as well as pragmatists, to
maintain a limited role for precedent in the resolution of constitutional
cases. This Article aims to broaden the overlapping consensus of interpretive
theories that can support a role for constitutional stare decisis, but to do this
it must narrow the circumstances in which stare decisis can be applied.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the difficulties in rec-
onciling constitutional stare decisis with textualist interpretive theories. The
problem, in short, is that stare decisis purports to allow erroneous Supreme
Court precedents to replace the written Constitution as the rule of decision
in constitutional litigation. This practice appears to contradict Article VI's
Supremacy Clause, which designates "This Constitution"-not "Supreme
Court doctrine"-as "the supreme Law of the Land."' 0 It also contradicts the
7. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 139 ("The whole function of the doctrine [of
stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be
held to be true, all in the interest of stability."); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office
of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1524 (2010) ("Stare decisis, in other words,
privileges tradition over any particular substantive position.").
8. Compare Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Supreme Court Prec-
edents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (arguing that the Constitution obligates inferior federal
courts to follow the Supreme Court's pronouncements), with John Harrison, Essay, The Power
of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 513 (2001) (claiming that rules of
vertical stare decisis cannot be derived from the Constitution and have the status of federal
common law).
9. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-
Comment: Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARv. L. REV. 145, 154 (2008)
("[T]he Constitution's text explicitly and unqualifiedly proclaims itself 'the supreme Law of
October 2011 ]
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textualists' insistence that judges construe the Constitution in accordance
with its original meaning rather than judge-created innovations. As a result,
several textualist commentators have declared that their interpretive com-
mitments forbid the justices to rely on precedents except when those
precedents represent proper textual constructions of the Constitution. 1 This
approach permits the justices to consult precedent for its epistemic value in
finding the right textualist answer to questions of constitutional interpreta-
tion, but it precludes them from invoking stare decisis, which lets precedent
supply the rule of decision in constitutional litigation without regard to its
correctness. On this view, constitutional stare decisis necessarily rests on
pragmatic interpretive methodologies, and is incompatible with any theory
of judging that demands fidelity to the original meaning of constitutional
text.
Part II refutes the notion that textualism requires a wholesale rejection
of constitutional stare decisis. Even for those who accept the textualists'
controversial interpretive premises-which equate "[tlhis Constitution" with
the meaning of the words in the context in which they were enacted, and
regard this original meaning as distinct from and superior to the interpretive
gloss of past Supreme Court rulings-the Supremacy Clause still allows for
a significant, though limited, role for stare decisis in constitutional adjudica-
tion. For a textualist, the constitutionality of stare decisis depends first on
whether the case presents a constitutional challenge to an act of Congress,
as opposed to a state law, and second on whether the justices are using stare
decisis as a sword (to nullify a law) or as a shield (to uphold it).
The indiscriminate textualist attacks on stare decisis go wrong by failing
to acknowledge two issues that the Constitution's text and original meaning
leave open. The first is whether, and to what extent, the Constitution obli-
gates the justices to nullify unconstitutional federal statutes. Critics of stare
decisis often assume that the Constitution compels the Supreme Court to
disregard acts of Congress whenever they conflict with a constitutional pro-
vision, in the same way that Article VI explicitly requires judges to
disregard state laws that contradict federal statutes, treaties, and constitu-
tional provisions. When one proceeds from this major premise, it logically
follows that the Supreme Court violates Article VI every time it invokes
stare decisis to uphold an unconstitutional federal statute; these rulings sub-
the Land'-supreme over any contrary statute, or executive order, or judicial precedent."
(footnote omitted)); John Harrison, Judicial Interpretive Finality and the Constitutional Text,
23 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 35 (2006) (noting that Article VI "does not give judicial opinions
the interpretive supremacy that it gives to substantive federal law").
11. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'y 23 (1994) [hereinafter Lawson, The Constitutional Case]; Gary Lawson, Mostly
Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007)
[hereinafter Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional]; Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with
Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
289 (2005); see also William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional
Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson, and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002
UTAH L. REV. 53.
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ordinate a "supreme" law (the Constitution) to a "nonsupreme" rule of deci-
sion (judicial precedent). But the major premise of this argument is wrong
on textual grounds; the written Constitution does not require the Supreme
Court to invalidate every federal statute that contravenes the Constitution.
Instead, the document gives the justices latitude in deciding whether and
when to invoke their implied power to review the constitutionality of con-
gressional acts.
To begin, Article VI designates federal statutes as "supreme" law, so
long as they are enacted "in Pursuance" of the Constitution. 2 This "in Pur-
suance" caveat is most plausibly read to confer supremacy on all statutes
that survive the bicameralism-and-presentment hurdles established in Article
I, Section 7V13 When the "supreme" Constitution conflicts with a "supreme"
federal statute, a textualist justice must adopt a tiebreaking strategy, and
there is nothing wrong with invoking an accepted practice such as stare de-
cisis to break this deadlock in favor of congressional legislation. Even for
those who believe that "in Pursuance thereof' requires federal statutes to
comport with the Constitution's substantive constraints on federal power, it
still does not follow that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Consti-
tution must always trump contrary interpretations adopted by the national
political branches. Instead, the Supreme Court may allocate final interpre-
tive authority over the Constitution in a manner that respects its institutional
rivals as coordinate branches of the federal government-just as the execu-
tive branch does when it decides to enforce federal statutes and court
judgments that the president considers repugnant to the Constitution. When
the justices invoke stare decisis to uphold federal statutes against constitu-
tional challenge, this is tantamount to a decision that allocates final
interpretive authority over a constitutional question to the national political
branches rather than the courts. Of course, Marbury v. Madison asserts that
federal statutes are "supreme" only when they comport with the Supreme
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 9 (1962) ("[T]he proviso that only those federal statutes are
to be supreme which are made in pursuance of the Constitution means that the statutes must
carry the outer indicia of validity lent them by enactment in accordance with the constitutional
forms."); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUN-
DRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 71-73 (1985) (noting that the text of the Supremacy Clause
"strongly suggests that the reference to laws made in pursuance of 'this Constitution' was
meant to distinguish those made under the Articles of Confederation"); Michael J. Ktarman,
How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2001)
("'In Pursuance thereof' means 'after,' not 'consistent with.' "); William W. Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 20-21 (observing that "[t]he phrase
'in pursuance thereof' might ... easily mean 'in the manner prescribed by this Constitution,'"
and concluding that "the only constitutional issue to be raised in a judicial forum to determine
whether an act of Congress should be given effect is whether the bill has been enacted accord-
ing to the forms prescribed in the Constitution"); id. at 21 ("It is ... significant that the clause
does not provide as follows: 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States authorized
and not limited thereby... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.'" (alteration in original)).
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Court's exposition of Congress's substantive powers,' 4 and many take that
decision to establish that the justices are duty-bound to disregard acts of
Congress that they deem repugnant to the Constitution. But the written Con-
stitution does not compel that approach, and one cannot attack the
constitutionality of stare decisis by assuming the correctness of a Supreme
Court precedent-even a canonical one like Marbury. In all events, the Su-
preme Court has established many exceptions to the Marbury principle,
such as nonjusticiability doctrines, the political-questions doctrine, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality, and rulings that rely on the "political
safeguards of federalism." Stare decisis is merely another example of the
justices respecting federal statutes as the final resolution of a constitutional
question, and these rulings do not violate the written Constitution, nor do
they violate textualist interpretive principles-even if they create tension
with the (nonsupreme) Marbury opinion.
The analysis changes when stare decisis leads the justices to invalidate
an act of Congress. When a federal statute both survives the bicameralism-
and-presentment process and complies with the Constitution's substantive
provisions, it becomes "the supreme Law of the Land," and the Supremacy
Clause precludes the justices from voting to invalidate that statute solely on
the ground that it conflicts with an earlier-decided Supreme Court prece-
dent. Using stare decisis in these situations would elevate a nonsupreme rule
of decision (judicial precedent) over the supreme law of the land (a constitu-
tional federal statute), violating the hierarchy established in Article VI's
Supremacy Clause. So the textualists' Supremacy Clause objections to stare
decisis are partly right. The Supremacy Clause does not preclude textualist
Supreme Court justices from ever applying stare decisis; rather, it permits an
asymmetrical regime that constrains their ability to use precedent when in-
validating an act of Congress, but leaves them free to invoke stare decisis
considerations in cases that uphold federal statutes against constitutional
challenge.
The textualists' wholesale attacks on stare decisis overlook another am-
biguity in the written Constitution: the extent to which it obligates federal
courts to apply state law as rules of decision. Many assume that the Consti-
tution requires federal courts to enforce state law whenever it complies with
the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties. But nothing in the Supremacy
Clause secures this status for state law. It merely establishes a two-tiered
hierarchy among the sources of law that courts might apply: the Constitu-
tion, federal statutes, and treaties are "supreme"; all other potential rules of
decision, such as state law, customary international law, and judicial prece-
dents, are nonsupreme. Article VI does not establish any rank among these
nonsupreme rules of decision. Nor does it preserve any status for state law;
it requires only that state law yield to the three categories of "supreme"
laws. The Supremacy Clause simply does not resolve whether the Supreme
Court should apply state law or judicial precedent in cases where they con-
flict. Even when a precedent misconstrues the Constitution, it can still
14. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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supply a nonsupreme, nonstate-law rule of decision-a status akin to the
"general common law" that existed prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,15
or the court-created admiralty and interstate law that the Supreme Court has
applied throughout its history. 16 Although Erie purported to squelch any
possibility of federal courts applying rules of decision other than "supreme"
federal laws and state law, at least one important category of general com-
mon law has survived the Erie revolution: the dubious or mistaken
constitutional pronouncements that the Supreme Court continues to use as
rules of decision in cases where litigants bring constitutional challenges to
state laws. And nothing in the text of the Supremacy Clause precludes the
Supreme Court from using its constitutional precedents as nonsupreme rules
of decision in this manner.
The Supremacy Clause does, however, restrict the justices' ability to in-
voke stare decisis in rulings that reject federal constitutional challenges to
state laws. State laws, unlike federal statutes, are nonsupreme rules of deci-
sion, and judicial precedent can never excuse a Supreme Court decision that
elevates an unconstitutional state law over a federal constitutional com-
mand. Although the text of the Constitution leaves room for courts to
enforce an unconstitutional federal statute or treaty, the Supremacy Clause
compels state law to yield to the "supreme Law of the Land" and specifical-
ly enlists the "Judges in every State" to enforce this hierarchy. So for
constitutional challenges to state laws, the Supremacy Clause again permits
an asymmetrical stare decisis regime, but with state law the imbalance runs
in the opposite direction: textualist justices may invoke stare decisis when
they subordinate (nonsupreme) state laws to (nonsupreme) judicial prece-
dent, but they cannot reject a federal constitutional challenge to state law
simply by incanting one of their erroneous, earlier-decided pronouncements.
This entire theory of stare decisis rests on a straightforward principle of
protestant constitutional interpretation: the Supreme Court is legally bound
to comply with the ratified text of the Constitution, but it is under no obliga-
tion to obey the self-imposed constraints of its earlier pronouncements.17
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. Charles Alan Wright and Mary Kay Kane note the Supreme Court's application of
this court-created common law over state law:
It is not accurate to say, however, that the law of the state is to be applied in all cases ex-
cept on matters governed by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Neither the
Constitution nor any statute provides the answer to controversies between states about
interstate streams, or similar interstate conflicts, nor do these sources indicate where the
governing law is to be found. Yet the Court, of necessity, has developed its own body of
law to govern these questions, because of the obvious unsuitability of looking to the law
of a particular state when two states are in dispute.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 413-14 (6th
ed. 2002).
17. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-30 (1988) (distinguishing
"protestant" and "catholic" strains in constitutional interpretation, where the former regards
constitutional text as the sole source of legal authority, while the latter confers an equally
authoritative status on unwritten traditions and the Supreme Court's past interpretive gloss).
October 2011]
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There is no cause for constitutional angst when the Supreme Court uses
stare decisis in a manner that produces inconsistencies with the needlessly
broad language in its Marbury and Erie opinions. Instead, constitutional
problems arise only when stare decisis causes the justices to invert or ignore
the hierarchy of laws established in Article VI, a disposition that disregards
the external legal commands imposed by those who enacted and ratified the
constitutional text. Those situations, however, are considerably more narrow
than the textualist critics of stare decisis suppose.
Part III explores how textualist jurists might implement this theory of
stare decisis in their decisionmaking strategies, when they may encounter
uncertainty in deciding whether a precedent correctly interpreted the Consti-
tution. And Part IV considers the implications of this theory for the Supreme
Court's case law.
I. STARE DECISIS AND THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Pragmatism and Textualism
Stare decisis isn't a particularly troubling practice for pragmatists or re-
alists. They generally take judicial review for granted, viewing the Supreme
Court as a political institution with a largely discretionary veto power over
federal and state laws.'8 Pragmatists of course recognize that political and
institutional realities constrain the Court's judicial-review practices. The
president and Senate, for example, use their appointment prerogatives to
bring the Court into line with their visions of the proper judicial role, and
the prospects of impeachment, constitutional amendment, jurisdiction-
stripping legislation, and political-branch defiance all keep the Court's rul-
ings within a range acceptable to the national political institutions. 19
Pragmatists also believe that courts should respect constitutional text. But
many pragmatists acknowledge constitutional language only because it
serves as a focal point, a convenient device that enables a diverse society to
agree on what constitutes fundamental law.20 The most sweeping forms of
pragmatic constitutional interpretation empower the justices to choose
among the linguistically permissible interpretations of constitutional provi-
sions, or even atextual interpretations, so long as they do not unravel the
18. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 12, 26 (2002) (noting that Supreme Court justices have "vir-
tually untrammeled policymaking authority" and characterizing the perception of judges as
"objective, dispassionate, and impartial" as "The Mythology of Judging"); Richard A. Posner,
The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 40
(2005) ("[T]he Supreme Court, when it is deciding constitutional cases, is political in the
sense of having and exercising discretionary power as capacious as a legislature's:").
19. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 125-57; see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in
a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957)
("[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy
views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.").
20. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 99-114 (Geoffrey R.
Stone ed., 2010).
[Vol. I110: 1
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document's ability to serve this useful coordinating function. For pragma-
tists, the Supreme Court's chief end is to generate positive consequentialist
outcomes within these realpolitik constraints. 21 And there is no shortage of
plausible consequentialist rationales for the Court's constitutional stare deci-
sis practices.
22
But stare decisis doctrines present more serious challenges for textualist
jurists. A textualist's primary concern is the legitimacy of judicial pro-
nouncements-how a court can justify commanding obedience to its
decisions, even from those who disagree with them. Textualists are not
indifferent to consequentialist considerations, but they deny that consequen-
tialist analysis alone can justify a court decision because people will
inevitably disagree over what counts as a normatively desirable outcome
(that's why the litigants are in court) and there are no reasons to think that
life-tenured judges have any comparative advantage in deciding what con-
sequences are "good."23 What's more, a society governed by law requires a
theory that distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate uses of force. De facto
power does not supply a justification for government action, even when
combined with a sincere belief that good consequences will ensue. Some-
thing more is needed to differentiate the coercive powers of a federal court
from those of a schoolyard bully.
Textualism holds that the written Constitution-rather than custom or
public acquiescence-enables the Supreme Court to legitimately invoke the
coercive powers of the state, and insists that the enacted constitutional lan-
guage both establishes and constrains the legitimate scope of the Supreme
Court's authority. Courts cannot bite the hand that feeds them. Of course, all
jurists, including pragmatists, claim to respect the Constitution's text. But
textualists reject the loose interpretive methodologies that allow judges to
adopt anachronistic or linguistically conceivable constructions of constitu-
tional language. Instead, they insist that the Supreme Court construe the
Constitution's text in the context in which it was enacted. There are variants
and nuances among these textualist theories of interpretation: some focus
on original public meaning,24 others target the framers' or ratifiers'
21. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE
FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009). Pragmatic jurists
may, of course, subordinate case-specific consequences to systemic and rule-consequentialist
concerns. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 238-39 ("[S]ensible legal pragmatism tells the
judge to consider systemic, including institutional, consequences as well as consequences of
the decision in the case at hand.... Sensible pragmatic judges are to be distinguished from
shortsighted pragmatists, blinded by the equities of the case to the long-term consequences of
their decision[.]").
22. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 153-82 (2006) (not-
ing that judges suffer from limited information and bounded rationality, which distort their
efforts to assess the consequences of their decisions); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989) (arguing that the legislature is a "more appropriate
expositor of social values" than the judiciary).
24. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) ("What counts as text is the document as
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understandings, 25 and still others try to uncover what a word or phrase fairly
meant at the time of enactment.2 6 But all of these approaches recognize that
the Supreme Court derives its powers from a higher source of authority, and
that the formal ratification of constitutional text serves as the mechanism by
which power is delegated to government institutions. It follows from this
view that judges must enforce the meaning of the enacted language rather
than the interpretations that modem-day judges find normatively desirable.
27
Of course, the justices may occasionally get away with rulings that depart
from textualist interpretive methodologies; the political branches lack the
wherewithal to counteract every atextual or ahistorical constitutional pro-
nouncement, and the public may acquiesce. But textualism deems these
decisions wrong-regardless of the positive consequences that they may
generate over the short term or the long run.28
Some commentators view textualism as nothing more than disguised
consequentialism. They regard talk of "legitimacy" as a rhetorical device
designed to induce courts to produce outcomes that textualists find agreea-
ble, and they call on textualists to defend these outcomes on
consequentialist grounds.2 9 But the textualist project is not intended to pro-
understood by the American People who ratified and amended it, and what counts as history is
accessible public meaning, not secret private intent.").
25. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997).
26. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38.
27. Critics of textualism like to trumpet the Constitution's substantive imperfections,
such as its initial toleration of slavery, and question its popular pedigree by noting that most of
its provisions were approved hundreds of years ago by people who are long dead and through
a process that excluded women and most blacks. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Essay, Common
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1733-35 (2003). But
textualists do not think that these defects-though serious and troubling-can liberate the
justices from their obligation to follow the meaning of the ratified text without simultaneously
undercutting the document's ability to vest the Supreme Court with any form of legitimate
power. No one believes that the Constitution's substance or popular pedigree is perfect, but
textualists reject the notion that these imperfections allow one to retain the court-empowering
provisions in the ratified Constitution without respecting its court-constraining provisions.
28. I use the term "textualism" rather than "originalism" to describe this approach to
constitutional interpretation for two reasons. First, "originalism" can encompass theories that
interpret constitutional provisions according to the intentions or specific expectations of the
drafters; textualism, by contrast, rejects this type of narrow intentionalism. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1120 n.4 (1998).
Second, textualism is wary of constitutional doctrines, such as the Dormant Commerce
Clause, that cannot plausibly be derived from the Constitution's language, even if one could
marshal historical evidence demonstrating that the drafters, ratifiers, and general public ex-
pected courts to enforce them. See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir.
2000) (Easterbrook, J.). For textualists, the written words of the Constitution have primacy;
original understandings that exist in the air do not control.
29. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 636, 644 (1999) (characterizing defenses of interpretive formalism as "pragmatic
arguments in disguise"). Some have tried to answer this challenge by offering rule-
consequentialist defenses of formalistic interpretive methodologies. See VERMEULE, supra
note 23, at 33 (defending interpretive formalism "because that decision-procedure will pro-
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vide a roadmap to utility maximization; it seeks to provide a theory that can
distinguish law from judicial fiat. It judges the correctness of judicial deci-
sionmaking by the criteria of text and history, rather than the more
subjective and indeterminate criteria of act- or rule-consequentialism.
30
Pragmatism and textualism represent distinct approaches to constitutional
law, and for stare decisis to attain unassailable acceptance in the legal pro-
fession, it must rest on rationales that can satisfy not only the pragmatists,
but also the subset of jurists and lawyers who embrace or lean toward textu-
alist interpretive methodologies. This Article does not take sides among
these approaches to constitutional interpretation, but seeks to establish an
overlapping consensus for stare decisis by providing a theory that enables
textualists to maintain a significant role for precedent in constitutional litiga-
tion.3
B. Textualism and Stare Decisis
Stare decisis allows the Supreme Court to uphold or invalidate a statute
based solely on its compliance (or noncompliance) with a prior Supreme
Court decision. The justices need not examine whether their precedent cor-
rectly interprets the Constitution; indeed, the very purpose of stare decisis is
to avoid the decision costs (and other costs) that would arise if the Court
were continually to reconsider previously decided constitutional questions.
Weaker theories of precedent allow the justices to consult prior decisions for
their epistemic value in helping them find the right answer to difficult con-
stitutional questions. But stare decisis is a stronger doctrine that deems
judicial precedents authoritative, enabling them to serve as the sine qua non
of a Supreme Court disposition.32
Stare decisis presents problems for textualist jurists because it allows the
Supreme Court to apply its precedents as rules of decision even when they
deviate from proper textualist interpretations of the Constitution. This prac-
tice seems to run headlong into Article VI of the Constitution, which
designates only three categories of laws as "the supreme Law of the Land":
"[t]his Constitution," the "[l]aws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof," and "[t]reaties made ... under the Authority of the
United States."33 Missing from this list are Supreme Court pronouncements,
duce the best ground-level consequences for legal institutions, rather than because some high-
er source of law or higher-level principle mandates it"); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 383, 384 (2007) (argu-
ing that adherence to the original meaning of provisions that surmounted the supermajoritarian
requirements of Articles V and VII is "likely to have good consequences").
30, See POSNER, supra note 4, at 240-41 (admitting that "what counts as an acceptably
pragmatic resolution of a dispute is relative to the prevailing norms of particular societies" and
that legal pragmatism does not even "specify which consequences should be considered").
31. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed., 2005).
32. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987) ("[A] pure
argument from precedent ... depends only on the results of those decisions, and not on the
validity of the reasons supporting those results.").
33. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
October 20111]
Michigan Law Review
so stare decisis appears to turn Article VI on its head when it allows a non-
supreme rule of decision (court precedent) to trump the Constitution (as
textualists would interpret it).34 This objection to stare decisis assumes that
"[t]his Constitution" should be interpreted in accordance with textualist in-
terpretive methodologies, but it has already been established that legal
pragmatism can accommodate stare decisis. The question to consider is
whether, and to what extent, stare decisis can also coexist with textualist
interpretive premises.
Textualist responses to this problem fall primarily into two camps. On
one side are those who deem stare decisis unconstitutional whenever it al-
lows precedent to trump the proper textualist interpretation of a
constitutional provision. Professor Lawson, for example, argues that the
Supremacy Clause permits the justices to rely on constitutional precedent
only for its epistemic value in finding the right answer to constitutional
questions, and never as an authoritative rule of decision in its own right.35
Other commentators reach similar conclusions.3 6 But even assuming that
this is a proper construction of the Supremacy Clause-Part II will reject
much of Professor Lawson's textual exegesis of Article VI-many textual-
ists are understandably reluctant to embrace this approach. First, political
realities make it impossible to nominate or confirm any jurist who denies
any authoritative role for constitutional precedent. Too many constituencies,
on both ends of the political spectrum, are intent on preserving at least a
subset of the Supreme Court's atextual, ahistorical, or poorly reasoned con-
stitutional pronouncements. 37 This is not to say that politics should control
constitutional interpretation, but it is a major strike against any theory of
judging-no matter how compelling it may seem to some-if its adherents
will be confined to the academy for life and unable to implement their
theory in the real world. Second, even if it were possible to appoint judges
who hold this view, this is simply not a responsible position. Many have
34. See, e.g., Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional, supra note 11, at 6.
35. See id. at 20 (arguing that the Constitution prohibits the Supreme Court from rely-
ing on precedent except in cases where prior court decisions supply "good evidence of the
right answer").
36. See Barnett, supra note 11, at 269 ("Where a determinate original meaning can be
ascertained and is inconsistent with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should be
reversed and the original meaning adopted in their place."); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Prece-
dent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 312-
13 (2005) ("[T]he Supreme Court ought to follow the text of the Constitution, as originally
understood, rather than its own precedents, where there is clear conflict between the two.");
Paulsen, supra note 11, at 291 ("Stare decisis is unconstitutional, precisely to the extent that it
yields deviations from the correct interpretation of the Constitution! It would have judges
apply, in preference to the Constitution, that which is not consistent with the Constitution.");
see also Consovoy, supra note 11, at 104, 106 ("The Court should abandon stare decisis in
constitutional cases.... Pragmatism has no place in the Supreme Court and its application in
the realm of stare decisis is unwarranted and unacceptable.").
37. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 727 ("[M]uch of the existing constitutional order is
at variance with what we know of the original understanding.").
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noted that the constitutionality of paper money would be called into ques-
tion if the justices were forbidden to invoke stare decisis. 38 Also, the
original understanding of the Commerce Clause is closer to Professor Ep-
stein's39 and Justice Thomas's views40 than the near-plenary power that
Congress enjoys under the Court's post-1937 jurisprudence.41 And Brown
v. Board of Education's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is
almost impossible to square with original-meaning textualism. 42 But a
Court opinion that even ponders the possibility of overturning the paper-
money cases would throw the economy into chaos; a ruling reversing the
New Deal would undermine decades of public and private decisions made
in reliance on that edifice; and a decision overruling Brown would damage
the Court's moral standing with the public. Textualism may reject conse-
quentialist considerations as the touchstone of judicial decisionmaking,
but if textualism compels these types of outcomes, then textualism will
never be a viable interpretive theory.
On the other side are textualists who treat stare decisis as a consequen-
tialist override to their interpretive commitments. Judge Easterbrook, for
example, argues that courts should preserve atextual doctrines like Miran-
da and "substantive due process" because they represent "structural
decision[s] on which other doctrines and institutions depend," and overrul-
ing them would undermine "stability in the structure of government."43 In
his view, constitutional stare decisis "depends on moral and prudential
judgments more than strictly legal ones."' Justice Scalia,45 Judge
38. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 389
("[A]lthough it may have been inconvenient to the proponents and constitutional defenders of
legal tender paper money, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Framers intended to
prohibit its use.").
39. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1987).
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001).
42. See David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
299, 305 (2005) (noting that the Brown Court "essentially conceded that the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment did not support the conclusion it reached in Brown"
and that "the best lawyers and best historians of the time could not identify an originalist ar-
gument for Brown that was plausible enough to be used even by a Court with every incentive
to use such an argument").
43. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 422, 430-33 (1988).
44. Id. at 432.
45. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 139 ("The whole function of [stare decisis] is to make
us say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the
interest of stability. It is a compromise of all philosophies of interpretation ... "); Scalia,
supra note 23, at 861-62 (conceding that "almost every originalist would adulterate original-
ism with the doctrine of stare decisis," because "most originalists are fainthearted").
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Bork,4" and Professor Amar 47 adopt similar rationales; each of them em-
braces constitutional stare decisis as an exception to their normal textualist
interpretive methodologies, and justify this carve-out by invoking conse-
quentialist considerations such as maintaining stability and protecting
reliance interests.
But these textualists' efforts to accommodate stare decisis also run into
serious objections. First, allowing judges to invoke stare decisis as a "prag-
matic exception" to textualism invites all sorts of ideological considerations
to influence judicial decisionmaking, and undermines the constraints on
judicial discretion that textualist interpretive methodologies are supposed to
provide. One need only look at the current Supreme Court, where everyone
seems to be a fair-weather friend when it comes to stare decisis. The Court's
liberal justices will not hesitate to overturn decisions like Bowers v. Hard-
wick4" or National League of Cities v. Usery,49 yet they solemnly invoke
stare decisis when the topic switches to abortion rights50 or the scope of fed-
eral power.5' Many of the Court's conservative jurists cheerfully overrule
adverse precedents on affirmative action52 or campaign-finance reform,5
while they build their state sovereign immunity jurisprudence on the edifice
of Hans v. Louisiana 5 -a contested interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment that the Court propounded more than 100 years ago. And the Court's
criteria for deciding whether to overrule a constitutional precedent-such as
the need to protect "reliance interests" created by erroneous court rulings-
are highly subjective. Every Supreme Court ruling establishes reliance inter-
ests; the decision to retain a Court precedent depends on the perceived
strength of those reliance interests and whether they are worth protecting,
and those questions involve value judgments more than legal analysis.5 It is
46. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 158 (1990). Bork argues that the justices should adhere to previous rulings, even if
"clearly incorrect," when they "have become so embedded in the life of the nation, so accept-
ed by the society, so fundamental to the private and public expectations of individuals and
institutions, that the result should not be changed now. This is a judgment addressed to the
prudence of a court." Id.
47. See Amar, supra note 24, at 28 ("[Pjure textualism can risk serious instability if not
chastened by attention to the legal status quo. Thus, even the best documentarian reading must
sometimes yield in court to brute facts bom of earlier judicial and political deviations.").
48. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
49. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
50. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
51. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-22 (2005).
52. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), overruling Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
53. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), overruling Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
54. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, generated strong reliance interests for slaveholders, but
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hard to refute the cynical observers who regard constitutional stare decisis
as little more than a rhetorical trope to disguise decisions that rest primarily
on the justices' ideological preferences. 56 And it is even harder for textual-
ism to maintain its pretense of constraining judicial power when it
accommodates these discretionary stare decisis considerations.57
Second, the idea of subjecting the words of the written Constitution to
consequentialist override contradicts the very premise of textualism, which
denies that judges can substitute their consequentialist assessments for legal
commands. Textualists insist that the ratification of constitutional language
establishes the Supreme Court's authority, and the meaning of those enacted
words simultaneously defines the limits of the Court's legitimate powers.
Allowing the justices to attain a prescriptive easement over the Constitu-
tion's original meaning is impossible to reconcile with this philosophy of
judging, especially when no provision in the Constitution purports to confer
a "stare decisis" dispensing power on the Supreme Court. Worse, this con-
cession to precedent makes it hard for textualists to denounce other justices'
excursions into living constitutionalism as unlawful or illegitimate. Once a
jurist acknowledges that the Supreme Court may subordinate constitutional
text or history to policy considerations, he has no standing to complain
when other justices use their powers to promote consequentialist outcomes
that they deem normatively desirable, such as abolishing the death penalty,58
forcing states to comply with the exclusionary rule,5 9 or advancing abortion
rights6° and homosexual rights.61 A partial surrender to judicial pragmatism
becomes a total surrender; once one concedes that consequences can trump
the original meaning of constitutional text, pragmatic considerations will
ultimately determine when one should prevail over the other.
So textualists seem stuck in a dilemma when it comes to stare decisis.
They can either selectively abandon their textualist interpretive methodolo-
gies or else follow their interpretive commitments to their logical
conclusions. The former path leads to accusations of hypocrisy, the latter to
no one thinks (and no one should think) that those reliance interests ought to compel the post-
Dred Scott Supreme Court to extend stare decisis to that ruling.
56. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note .18, at 81 ("[P]recedent... provides virtual-
ly no guide to the justices' decisions. All that one can say is that precedent is a matter of good
form, rather than a limit on the operation of judicial policy preferences."); see also id. at 288-
3 11 (presenting empirical data to support this view of precedent).
57. In the words of Chief Justice Roberts, stare decisis requires the Court to "balance
the importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having
them decided right." See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 920 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). This
balancing test provides no guidance to justices who must weigh these competing concerns.
58. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
60. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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ridicule-or so the critics say.62 Either way, constitutional stare decisis
seems incompatible with textualist theories of constitutional interpretation.
II. RECONCILING STARE DECISIS WITH CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
Textualists can escape this dilemma only by embracing a theory of stare
decisis that is both rooted in textualist interpretive methodologies and that
cabins judicial discretion more than the hollow balancing tests that the cur-
rent Supreme Court employs. Section II.A considers three of the leading
theories that have attempted to reconcile stare decisis with constitutional
text. Although each has some surface plausibility, none of them supplies a
satisfying account of stare decisis for textualists who equate "It]his Consti-
tution" with the original meaning of its words. Worse, none of these existing
textual theories provides much guidance on when a justice should adhere to
or disregard a wrongly decided precedent. Section II.B places stare decisis
on a more secure textual footing by demonstrating that the Supremacy
Clause-in limited situations-permits textualist justices to use wrongly
decided precedents as rules of decision in constitutional litigation.
A. Previous Efforts to Reconcile Stare Decisis with Constitutional Text
1. Equating Supreme Court Precedent with the
"Supreme Law of the Land"
One possible way to counter the Supremacy Clause objections to stare
decisis is by elevating the Supreme Court's constitutional precedents into
the "supreme [f]aw" described in Article VI, either by equating them with
the Constitution itself,63 or by treating past Supreme Court pronouncements
as authoritative constructions of the document.' The former approach is
62. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 20, at 17 (arguing that rigorous originalism produces
results that are "inconsistent with principles that are at the core of American constitutional
law," and that "fainthearted" originalism that accommodates stare decisis removes constraints
on judicial discretion and allows judges to become "sometime-living-constitutionalists"); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR
AMERICA 53-78 (2005) (arguing that original-meaning textualism is "radical" and "indefensi-
ble" unless tempered by stare decisis, and that "faint-hearted" textualists who accommodate
stare decisis "cannot easily show that their approach promotes their goal of binding judges
through clear rules"); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
156-57 (1999) (criticizing "conservative originalists" for opportunistically invoking stare
decisis to preserve nonoriginalist rulings such as Brown v. Board of Education, while refusing
to accede to other nonoriginalist rulings, such as Roe v. Wade).
63. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (equating the majority opinions
that accompany the Supreme Court's resolution of constitutional cases with the "supreme Law
of the Land" described in Article VI); CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, ADDRESSES OF CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES, 1906-1916, 185 (2d ed. 1916) ("We are under a Constitution, but the Consti-
tution is what the judges say it is .... ").
64. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (1997) (arguing that nonjudicial officials should
respect the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements as a binding interpretive gloss on
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demonstrably implausible; an institution's past interpretations of the Consti-
tution do not become part of the Constitution, even in a world where other
government actors regard the Supreme Court as the authoritative expositor
of constitutional meaning. What's more, drawing a distinction between
"[tihis Constitution" and past judicial interpretations is logically necessary
to preserve the Court's power to overrule its past constitutional pronounce-
ments. 61 Supreme Court pronouncements can help disambiguate and settle
disputed constitutional issues, but one cannot treat this interpretive gloss as
part of the Constitution itself.
66
Yet none of this forecloses the justices from treating their earlier consti-
tutional precedents as authoritative constructions of the document.
Textualists may insist that Article VI's reference to "[tihis Constitution"
refers only to the original meaning of its text, but this does not supply any
answer to the question of interpretive finality: Which institutions or process-
es conclusively resolve disputes over the Constitution's meaning?
Even textualists recognize that few, if any, government actors possess
wholesale interpretive autonomy over the Constitution. Inferior federal
courts follow the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements. Presi-
dents enforce federal-court judgments in constitutional cases, even if they
would have decided the constitutional issues differently.67 And the Supreme
Court, when it invokes the "political-questions doctrine," allows the political
branches to have the final say on disputed issues of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Because the Constitution is largely silent on questions of interpretive
finality, one must consider whether it leaves room for textualist justices to
designate their predecessors' interpretations as authoritative expositions of
constitutional meaning. If so, then Article VI would liberate even textualist
justices to apply "[t]his Constitution"-as interpreted by past Supreme
Courts-as the "supreme" rule of decision, treating the Court's precedents
as conclusive gloss on the document.68
the document, even in the case of "judicial interpretations [of constitutional provisions] they
believe wrong").
65. See David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 113, 135 (1993) ("Of course there is a difference between constitutional law and the
Constitution, and there are times when the former should be changed to make it more con-
sistent with the latter."). One might analogize the relationship between the Constitution and
Supreme Court precedent to the relationship between statutes and agency regulations. Agency
regulations are regarded as binding interpretations of statutes, but they are not themselves
statutes. An agency can unilaterally revoke its regulations, but it can never amend a statute
outside of Article I, Section 7's bicameralism-and-presentment procedures.
66. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("[Tihe ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and
not what we [justices] have said about it.").
67. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008).
68. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfur-
ter, J., concurring) ("It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to




But it is hard for a textualist to accept this construction of Article VI.
The Constitution's failure to specify clear rules of interpretive finality does
not empower the justices to assign interpretive authority over the Constitu-
tion to whomever suits their druthers. The Supreme Court could not treat the
UN secretary-general's interpretations of constitutional provisions as author-
itative rules of decision, nor could it confer this status on a law professor's
academic writings, no matter how reliable those interpreters might be. Ra-
ther, a textualist justice must show how provisions in the written
Constitution authorize him to respect the finality of some other institution's
constitutional pronouncements, even when those interpretations flout the
original meaning of constitutional text.6 9 A textualist district-court judge, for
example, might accept the justices' nontextualist opinions as the authorita-
tive exposition of constitutional meaning because Article III designates their
court "supreme" and his court "inferior."70 The Supreme Court can make a
similar type of showing in cases involving a "textually demonstrable consti-
tutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."
7'
And when a question of constitutional interpretation lacks "judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it," this can imply that the
Supreme Court should accept the resolutions reached by the national politi-
cal branches rather than attempt to establish an ad hoc and unprincipled
constitutional jurisprudence.7
But does the Constitution authorize a textualist justice to treat his prede-
cessors' nontextualist opinions as final and authoritative expositions of
constitutional meaning? It is more difficult to square this allocation of inter-
pretive authority with a textualist interpretation of the document. First, no
language in the Constitution indicates that the Supreme Court should obey
an earlier Court's erroneous constitutional precedents. 73 And although a
plausible textual case can be made for allowing the Supreme Court to re-
spect federal statutes as final and conclusive interpretations of the
69. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial
Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333, 358 (1998) (arguing that judges start with interpretive authority
over the Constitution unless and until they "encounter a finality rule" instructing them to ac-
cept someone else's interpretation).
70. See Amar, supra note 24, at 80; Caminker, supra note 8.
71. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). For example, when the Constitution gives
the Senate "the sole [p]ower to try all [i]mpeachments," U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis
added), this language indicates that the Senate, rather than the Supreme Court, will have the
final say on the trial procedures that it will use. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238
(1993).
72. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Laws
promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pro-
nounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.").
73. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 8, at 513 (demonstrating the impossibility of deriving
the federal courts' stare decisis doctrines from constitutional text).
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Constitution,7 4 there are no textual provisions that imply a similar status for
the views expressed in the Court's previously announced opinions.
75
Second, even if the Constitution's silence on issues of interpretive finali-.
ty might allow the justices to respect constitutional pronouncements from
different institutions of the federal government, it still does not follow that
the justices may bestow "finality" status on the erroneous rulings of their
predecessors. It is one thing for the Court to accord finality to interpretations
rendered by one or more of its rival, coordinate federal branches. It is quite
another matter for the Supreme Court to decide to resolve a constitutional
issue and then allow its predecessors' wrongly decided rulings to control its
judgment. When the Court does this, there are two ways to characterize its
actions. On one view, the justices are asserting interpretive authority over a
constitutional issue and then choosing, as a matter of policy, to follow a mis-
taken interpretation of their predecessors. Although pragmatists might
comfortably embrace this rationalization for stare decisis, a textualist can-
not. Once a textualist justice decides to interpret a disputed constitutional
provision, he must interpret the Constitution according to textualist interpre-
tive methodologies; he cannot decide to embrace the nontextualist decisions
of his predecessors for policy reasons.
On another view, a court that chooses to invoke stare decisis is simply
conferring interpretive finality on the opinions of its predecessors. But a
textualist justice who treats his predecessors' rulings as binding and conclu-
sive gloss will generate tension with Article V, which prevents federal
institutions from amending the Constitution outside the supermajoritarian
processes that the document establishes. When the Supreme Court treats its
institutional rivals' interpretations of the Constitution as authoritative, those
interpretations, even if mistaken, at least remain defeasible by the democrat-
ically accountable institutions that enacted them. Congress can repeal an
unconstitutional statute; presidents can revoke unconstitutional policies or
pronouncements. This is what distinguishes an erroneous constitutional in-
terpretation from a de facto constitutional amendment: the institution that
promulgated the interpretation retains the power to revoke it without using
Article V's amendment process. If a court declines to invalidate an unconsti-
tutional federal statute by invoking the political-questions doctrine or
denying the propriety of judicial review, this decision will not produce a de
facto constitutional amendment because the statute still remains subject to
repeal by the ordinary political processes.
76
74. See infra notes 103-123 and accompanying text.
75. See Harrison, supra note 10, at 35 (noting that Article VI "does not give judicial
opinions the interpretive supremacy that it gives to substantive federal law").
76. Some commentators argue that Article V requires the Supreme Court to exercise
judicial review because enforcing unconstitutional statutes would produce de facto constitu-
tional amendments. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial
Review, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 887, 918 (2003) ("Without judicial review (or executive or legisla-
tive review, for that matter), the federal government would be able to circumvent Article V
.... This would allow the government to effectively amend the Constitution without undergo-
ing Article V's difficult supermajoritarian process."). This overlooks Congress's ability to
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It's different when the Supreme Court decides that its predecessors' er-
roneous constitutional pronouncements represent the authoritative
construction of the document, and then uses those precedents to nullify the
decisions of elected officials. In these situations, the justices are interpreting
the Constitution to entrench these earlier (mistaken) interpretations from
repeal; they have foresworn their prerogative to correct their predecessors'
mistakes by invoking stare decisis and equating the precedent with the au-
thoritative exposition of constitutional meaning. Now the Court's wrongly
decided precedent becomes more akin to a de facto constitutional amend-
ment, as the justices claim that their earlier-decided ruling-even though
mistaken-binds not only other government actors but also the justices
themselves. It is important not to overstate this point; a future Supreme
Court will still retain the prerogative to overrule the disputed precedent,
even if today's Supreme Court declines to do so. But a textualist that inter-
prets Article VI to foreclose this option causes himself to enforce a
"constitutional" rule that never received the supermajoritarian pedigrees
required by Articles V or VII, and that cannot be changed except through the
extraordinary processes of constitutional amendment or (perhaps) new Su-
preme Court appointments. This construction of the Supremacy Clause is
harder to square with Article V than the more benign practice of assigning
interpretive authority to a rival federal institution that acknowledges its con-
tinuing prerogative to amend or revoke its constructions of the Constitution.
All of these problems make this precedent-as-final-interpretation theory a
challenging and difficult account for textualist jurists to embrace.
2. Interpreting Article III's Vesting Clause to Authorize
Constitutional Stare Decisis
A number of textualist commentators maintain that Article III's Vesting
Clause empowers the justices to invoke stare decisis and apply atextual or
erroneous precedents as rules of decision in constitutional litigation. On this
view, the provision that vests the Supreme Court with "the judicial Power of
the United States"77 implicitly authorizes the justices to employ stare decisis
because English and colonial courts were known to follow precedent at the
time of founding.78 But several problems confront textualists who want to
repeal an unconstitutional statute through the normal bicameralism-and-presentment process-
es, which distinguishes a mistaken congressional interpretation from a de facto constitutional
amendment.
77. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
78. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 46, at 157 ("[A]rticle III vests the 'judicial Power' in the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts. At the time of the ratification, judicial power was
known to be to some degree confined by an obligation to respect precedent." (footnote omit-
ted)); Amar, supra note 10, at 157 (arguing that Article III's Vesting Clause "envision[s] a
system in which Article III tribunals will sit in judgment over events that have already oc-
curred and will decide these cases, not by creating new rules, but by declaring the preexisting
federal law that applied when the relevant litigation-creating events happened"); see also John
0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U.
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adopt this Article III argument as their justification for constitutional stare
decisis.
First, Article VI establishes a specific hierarchy of rules of decision for
the courts to follow, ensconcing "[t]his Constitution," federal statutes, and
treaties as "supreme" law while omitting judicial precedents from this exalt-
ed status. Article III's language is too vague to invert this rank by elevating
an atextual or ahistorical Supreme Court precedent above a proper textualist
interpretation of the document. The Vesting Clause speaks only of "the judi-
cial Power," and does not purport to address the substantive laws or rules of
decision that the federal courts would apply. The Supremacy Clause fills this
gap and should bind the Supreme Court; its specific choice-of-law provi-
sions cannot be trumped by the amorphous Vesting Clause language.
A more sophisticated variant of this Article III argument might try to use
the Vesting Clause, and the English history that it arguably incorporates, as
evidence that the "supreme" laws delineated in Article VI should be inter-
preted with an eye toward precedent. This approach aims to preserve rather
than invert Article VI's hierarchy of laws. But it can secure only a limited,
epistemic role for precedent-one that helps judges find the right answers to
constitutional questions according to their interpretive commitments. A tex-
tualist who equates "rt]his Constitution" with the original meaning of its
words will remain unable to enforce a nontextualist precedent over the "su-
preme Law of the Land," at least not without compromising his fidelity to
textualist interpretive methodologies.
Second, the practices of English and colonial courts at the time of the
founding have little bearing on whether Article III authorizes the justices to
invoke stare decisis in constitutional litigation. Those courts acted under a
regime of parliamentary omnipotence rather than constitutional suprema-
cy.7 9 And their practices of adhering to precedent in common-law and
statutory cases, where judicial precedents are subject to legislative override,
cannot supply a justification for stare decisis in constitutional litigation,
where the Supreme Court's rulings can be changed only with constitutional
amendments or new judicial appointments. Even Lord Coke's decision in
Dr Bonham's Case,8" which suggested that established common-law cus-
toms could trump a later-enacted act of Parliament,8 comes nowhere close
to suggesting that a court's post-ratification deviations from a written
L. REV. 803, 823-25 (2009) (arguing that Article III's Vesting Clause requires the justices to
give some weight to precedent).
79. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 91 (Clarendon Press 1765)
("[I]f the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of
no power that can control it .... "); id. at 156 ("[Parliament is] the place where that absolute
despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitu-
tion of these kingdoms.").
80. 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 8 Co. Rep. I 14a (C.P. 1610).
81. Id. at 652; 8 Co. Rep. at 118a ("[I]n many cases, the common law will ... controul
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Par-
liament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.").
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Constitution can prevail over the document's original understanding.82 And
in all events, it is questionable to assume that Article III's Vesting Clause
would implicitly incorporate all of the practices of English and colonial
courts, especially a controversial practice like stare decisis. The colonial
courts were a major source of the grievances listed in the Declaration of
Independence,83 and they provided the impetus for many of the Constitu-
tion's explicit protections against judicial abuses, including life tenure,
salary protection, the right of jury trial, a definition of treason, and Article
VI's provision for constitutional supremacy.
Third, the reporting of court decisions was poor at the time of the Con-
stitution's ratification. Congress did not authorize an official reporter for
Supreme Court decisions until 1817.84 And the early Supreme Court initially
followed the British practice of seriatim opinions; only later, under Chief
Justice Marshall, did the justices coalesce behind a single opinion of the
Court that could serve as authoritative precedent.85 All of this further damp-
ens any possibility that the original meaning of Article III's Vesting Clause
licensed the robust stare decisis norms that the Supreme Court regularly
employs in modem constitutional litigation, where widely disseminated
opinions for the Court establish broad principles that purport to control fu-
ture judicial decisionmaking.
3. Stare Decisis as a Heuristic
Finally, Professor Schauer argues that textualists who acknowledge the
epistemic value of Supreme Court precedent in finding the right answer to
disputed constitutional questions may also treat these past constitutional
pronouncements as authoritative rules of decision. 86 On this view, stare deci-
sis functions as a rule of thumb that treats "all cases coming from a
particular source as presumptively persuasive."87 This approach reconceptu-
alizes stare decisis as a decisionmaking strategy for textualist jurists. Rather
82. Scholars debate whether Coke's views accurately reflected English common-law
practices, but Coke undoubtedly influenced American constitutional thought. See, e.g., Joyce
Lee Malcolm, Whatever the Judges Say It Is? The Founders and Judicial Review, 26 J.L. &
POL. 1, 13-15 (2010) (discussing Coke's influence on the founders).
83. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 10-11 (U.S. 1776).
84. See Harrison, supra note 10, at 43-45; see also William Michael Treanor, Judicial
Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 476, 478, 519-20 (2005) (describing revolu-
tionary-era state-court cases that were published only in newspapers accounts).
85. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Lecture, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (2010).
86. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional
Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45 (1994).
87. Id. at 49; see also id. ("[I]t is hard to see that anything in the Constitution permits
case-by-case persuasion by prior judicial actions but prohibits less case-specific persuasion by
prior judicial actions.... This, of course, is just what stare decisis is-the imposed assump-
tion, without retail inspection, that decisions from some source are likely to be followed
because of ex ante presuppositions about their likely content, such as the presupposition that
earlier cases were likely to have been decided correctly.").
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than inverting the hierarchy of laws established in Article VI, or treating past
Court majorities as final expositors of constitutional meaning, Professor
Schauer rationalizes stare decisis as a decision costs-reducing shortcut for
textualist judges who seek to interpret the Constitution in good faith while
dealing with their limited institutional capacities and the scarcity of judicial
time and resources. 8 Professor Nelson offers a similar theory of stare deci-
sis, in which the Supreme Court's constitutional precedents control only
when they offer plausible (even if mistaken) interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. This approach allows (but does not compel) the justices to overrule
their "demonstrably erroneous" constitutional precedents.89
All theories of judging must acknowledge that judges decide cases under
feasibility constraints-even textualist judges must trade off decision costs
against error costs.9" Judicial resources run out before a judge can be as-
sured that his decision comports with his first-order interpretive
commitments, leading judges to resort to heuristics and tiebreaking mecha-
nisms such as evidentiary presumptions or canons of construction. 91 And it
is easy to see how pragmatists, who typically strive to minimize the sum
total of decision costs and error costs in judicial decisionmaking,92 would
want to embrace stare decisis as a device that can dramatically reduce the
decision costs of constitutional litigation while producing only a small up-
tick in error costs-although these calculations ultimately depend on some
difficult-to-resolve empirical questions as well as a theory of what consti-
tutes "correct" judicial decisionmaking.
But a textualist jurist cannot easily invoke the need to conserve decision
costs to justify constitutional stare decisis. First, few if any textualists regard
decision costs as commensurate with error costs in constitutional litigation.
From a textualist standpoint, a constitutional ruling that incurs error costs
can cause the Supreme Court to exceed the scope of its legitimate power. A
decisionmaking strategy that involves increased decision costs, by contrast,
will lead to different types of harms, such as reducing judicial leisure or
diverting judicial time away from other cases, which may or may not in-
crease the likelihood of errors in those cases. Pragmatists will have an easier
time embracing decisionmaking strategies that trade off decision costs
against error costs in constitutional litigation; most textualists will want to
minimize constitutional error costs as far as possible before resorting to heu-
ristics or tiebreakers.
88. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullman-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions,
110 ETHics 5, 7 (1999) (discussing and clarifying the choices among "second-order deci-
sions," the "decisions about the appropriate strategy for reducing the problems associated with
making a first-order decision").
89. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1, 53 (2001).
90. See infra Part III.
91. See generally VERMEULE, supra note 23; Adam M. Samaha, On Law's liebreakers,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661 (2010).
92. See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 647.
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Second, even when a textualist needs heuristics to resolve difficult con-
stitutional issues, an approach that categorically assumes the correctness of
the Supreme Court's precedents is unlikely to produce reliable answers.
With so many atextual and ahistorical precedents on the books, constitution-
al stare decisis seems an exceptionally poor decisionmaking strategy for
textualists seeking to minimize error costs within the institutional con-
straints that they face. A better approach would limit constitutional stare
decisis to opinions written by textualist Supreme Court justices, or consult
the academic writings of textualist commentators to determine whether a
precedent should be followed.
Third, many of the Supreme Court's precedents are demonstrably mis-
taken as a matter of original meaning and textualist jurists nevertheless
adhere to them on stare decisis grounds. These include the Court's exclu-
sionary-rule edicts, 93 the Warren Court's use of the Equal Protection Clause
to protect voting rights,94 and modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.95
A textualist jurist cannot credibly invoke the need to resort to heuristics or
rules of thumb as a justification for following these decisions; it requires
hardly any time or research to conclude that these rulings are manifestly
incompatible with a textualist's interpretive commitments. And although
Professor Nelson allows that the justices might adhere to even a demonstra-
bly erroneous prior decision if they can find "some special reason to adhere
to it,"96 he does not explain how the text of the Constitution could ever per-
mit the justices to elevate these raw consequentialist considerations over
faithful interpretation of the document.
B. Stare Decisis and the Supremacy Clause
All of these theories of constitutional stare decisis seek to reconcile the
Court's stare decisis practices with the Constitution's language, but none of
them provides an entirely satisfying account for those who embrace textual-
ist interpretive commitments. On top of that, none of these accounts limits a
justice's discretion to follow or overrule an erroneous constitutional prece-
dent. Each of these theories offers little more than a vague balancing test,
making it impossible to falsify a justice's preference for preserving or re-
versing his predecessors' mistaken constitutional pronouncements.
This section will place constitutional stare decisis on a more secure tex-
tual footing by relying on the very provision that the textualist critics of
stare decisis invoke for their attacks-the Supremacy Clause. The next four
93. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 20-31 (1997).
94. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Cur-
rent Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 110 (2000) ("[I]t is clear-a word that
can rarely be used in this field of law-that the Equal Protection Clause was not originally
understood by its framers to encompass voting rights.").
95. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 481 (2002) ("[Tlhe
constitutional authority for separation [of church and state] is without historical foundation.").
96. See Nelson, supra note 89, at 5.
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subsections examine the constitutionality of stare decisis in four discrete
categories of cases. Sections II.B.1 and II.B.2 consider whether the Consti-
tution permits textualist justices to invoke stare decisis when rejecting or
sustaining constitutional challenges to federal statutes or treaties. Sections
II.B.3 and II.B.4 explore whether textualists may invoke precedent when
considering constitutional challenges to state laws. To simplify the analysis,
this section will bracket questions of institutional capacities and assume that
judges can distinguish correct and mistaken precedents with perfect accura-
cy. It aims only to demonstrate the circumstances in which the Supremacy
Clause might constrain the use of stare decisis in constitutional litigation.
Part III will then consider the implications of this theory in light of institu-
tional realities, when Supreme Court justices may be uncertain or mistaken
over whether a constitutional precedent is right or wrong, and consider ap-
propriate decisionmaking strategies for textualist judges who encounter the
inevitable feasibility constraints that afflict all interpretive methodologies.
1. Invoking Precedent to Uphold a Federal Statute
Wickard v. Filburn97 holds that Congress's Article I commerce powers
allow it to regulate the consumption of homegrown wheat, even when no
sales or transactions occur. Many have criticized this ruling for giving Con-
gress near-plenary power over the economy, which is hard to reconcile with
the limited language of the Commerce Clause.98 What's more, historical
evidence shows that many understood "commerce" to exclude "agriculture"
at the time the Constitution was ratified.99 And the southern states never
would have ratified the Constitution if the commerce power had been under-
stood to allow Congress to abolish slavery within their borders. 00 Let us
assume, solely for the sake of argument, that Wickard misinterpreted the
scope of the federal commerce power. The question is whether the Constitu-
tion allows a justice to uphold the federal Controlled Substances Act in
Gonzales v. Raich'°l merely by invoking Wickard and treating it as disposi-
tive of the litigants' federal constitutional claims.
At first glance, this type of disposition in Raich seems to be a paradig-
matic violation of the Supremacy Clause. The justices allow one of their
precedents, a nonsupreme rule of decision (and an erroneous one at that), to
control the outcome at the expense of the Constitution itself-the supreme
law of the land. 10 2 But this view is too simplistic in cases where the justices
uphold an act of Congress against constitutional challenge. Even if one
97. 317U.S. 111 (1942).
98. See Epstein, supra note 39, at 1451 ("Could anyone say with a straight face that the
consumption of homegrown wheat is 'commerce among the several states?' "); see also United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. See Barnett, supra note 41, at 101-02.
100. See Richard A. Epstein, Propter Honoris Respectum, Constitutional Faith and the
Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 170 (1996).
101. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
102. See Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional, supra note 11, at 6.
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accepts the textualists' interpretive premises, which equate "[t]his Constitu-
tion" with the original public meaning of its words, the Supremacy Clause
still does not compel the justices to invalidate every federal statute that con-
travenes a federal constitutional provision.
Start with the text of Article VI's Supremacy Clause. It establishes three
categories of "supreme" laws: "[t]his Constitution," the "Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof," and "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States." This means
that federal statutes are as "supreme" as the Constitution-provided that
they are "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution. But the "made in Pursu-
ance thereof' caveat is ambiguous: it might mean that federal statutes are
"supreme" only when the Supreme Court deems them consistent with the
substantive constitutional constraints on Congress's powers, or it might con-
fer supremacy on any statute that survives the bicameralism-and-
presentment procedures that the Constitution requires for congressional
lawmaking. 103 Many textualists simply assume that the former construction
is correct, largely because Marbury v. Madison asserted that the "made in
pursuance" language excludes from supremacy acts of Congress that the
Supreme Court deems unconstitutional,"° a view that not only authorizes
but obligates the justices to subordinate federal statutes to their own inter-
pretations of the Constitution. But because this understanding of Marbury
has become a habit of thinking among judges and lawyers alike, it is easy to
overlook the textual problems that confront this interpretation of the Su-
premacy Clause.
First, the "made in Pursuance thereof' caveat attaches only to acts of
Congress and not treaties, and it does not seem tenable to think that Article
VI would compel the Supreme Court to subordinate federal statutes that it
deems unconstitutional yet withhold a similar obligation to nullify unconsti-
tutional treaties. Treaties, unlike federal statutes, are "supreme" so long as
they are made "under the Authority of the United States"; this discrepancy
was designed to preserve the supremacy of treaty obligations undertaken
during the Articles of Confederation.0 5 This implies that the "made in Pur-
103. During Pennsylvania's ratification convention, for example, Robert Whitehill ar-
gued that federal statutes could be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution so long as they
survived the bicameralism-and-presentment processes. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: PENNSYLVANIA 513 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOLUME 2]. James Wilson, by contrast, disagreed with
this construction of the Supremacy Clause and insisted that federal courts would nullify un-
constitutional congressional enactments. Id. at 517.
104. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (construing "in pursuance thereof' to require compliance with Con-
stitution's substantive restrictions on federal power).
105. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he rea-
son treaties were not limited to those made in 'pursuance' of the Constitution was so that
agreements made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation, including the im-
portant peace treaties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect."). The
Reid plurality opinion went on to insist that treaties, like statutes, must comport with the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 17.
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suance thereof' language excludes only the federal statutes enacted before
the Constitution's ratification, and that acts of Congress qualify as supreme
law so long as they postdate the Constitution and surmount the bicameral-
ism-and-presentment hurdles in Article I, Section 7.106 What's more, Article
I, Section 7 provides that a bill attains the title of "law" once it successfully
runs the bicameralism-and-presentment gauntlet; it does not make this status
contingent on whether the statute comports with the Constitution's substan-
tive provisions--or the justices' interpretations of them. 107
Second, even if it were correct to insist that the Supremacy Clause, or
perhaps some structural inference from the Constitution, requires federal
statutes to comply with the Constitution's substantive provisions,' it is
hard to accept the additional claim that the Supreme Court's interpretations
of those provisions must always trump the constitutional interpretations
adopted by the national political branches. Chief Justice Marshall, of course,
famously declared in Marbury that "[ilt is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."'" But that is a con-
clusion, not an argument; Marshall begs the question and baldly asserts that
the Supreme Court's interpretations of constitutional provisions should pre-
vail over Congress's, rather than the other way around. 10 It is equally
plausible to conclude that the electorate, rather than the Supreme Court,
should judge the constitutionality of congressional statutes, and remedy vio-
lations by electing new representatives who will repeal the unconstitutional
106. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 13, at 72-73 (noting that the Supremacy Clause "em-
braces treaties made both before and after adoption of the Constitution" and that "the contrast
strongly suggests that the reference to laws made in pursuance of 'this Constitution' was
meant to distinguish those made under the Articles of Confederation" (footnotes omitted));
Klarman, supra note 13, at 1119 ("[T]he Framers probably intended 'in Pursuance thereof' to
signify a temporal rather than a logical connection.").
107. Article I, Section 7 establishes three processes by which a bill becomes law. The
first is approval by each house of Congress followed by the president's signature; the Constitu-
tion requires presentment to the president "before it become a Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2. The second is a two-thirds vote in each house to override a presidential veto; after this hap-
pens, it "shall become a Law'" Id. The third involves approval by each house and the president
allows it to become law without his signature; when this occurs, it "shall be a Law." Id.
108. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 596 (2008) (acknowledg-
ing that the text of the Supremacy Clause does not "stipulate the relative supremacy of the
Constitution over federal statutes and treaties" yet insisting that the Constitution's supremacy
over federal statutes "could be taken for granted").
109. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
110. Many commentators have criticized this question-begging fallacy in the Marbury
opinion. See BICKEL, supra note 13, at 2-3; CURRIE, supra note 13, at 71 n.49; VERMEULE,
supra note 23, at 234; Harrison, supra note 69, at 334; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 21. Per-
haps Marshall's rejection of congressional supremacy is rooted in an intuition that foxes
should not guard henhouses, but the president's veto already protects against congressional
self-aggrandizement, and in all events Marbury-style judicial supremacy presents the recipro-
cal danger of empowering the justices to expand their own constitutional powers at the
expense of the other branches.
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enactments.' In Federalist No. 33, for example, Hamilton rejected the no-
tion that unconstitutional federal statutes could qualify as "the supreme law
of the land,''12 but he also stated that the people rather than the courts were
responsible for redressing the constitutional violation." 3 Only later, in Fed-
eralist No. 78, did Hamilton acknowledge judicial review as a possible
remedy for unconstitutional federal statutes, and this was to refute an anti-
Federalist's claims that the Constitution conferred far-reaching powers on
federal judges to nullify democratically enacted legislation. 1"' Of course,
what Hamilton actually believed about judicial review is not controlling; the
point is only that his analysis in Federalist No. 33 demonstrates how the
Supremacy Clause need not be read to obligate the Supreme Court to nullify
unconstitutional federal statutes-even if one believes (as Hamilton did) that
Article VI excludes unconstitutional congressional enactments from the
"supreme Law of the Land."
Third, the Constitution establishes three coordinate and independent
branches of the federal government. It is difficult to reconcile that constitu-
tional structure with a Supreme Court that categorically elevates its
interpretations of the Constitution over the constructions that its rival
branches adopt when enacting federal statutes.' Indeed, if the Supreme
Court has free rein to reject federal statutes that it deems unconstitutional,
111. See, e.g., Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 355 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissent-
ing) (rejecting judicial review and insisting that "it rests with the people, in whom full and
absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing their repre-
sentatives to repeal the obnoxious act"); Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 77 (1793)
(opinion of Tucker, J.) ("[T]he constitution of a state is a rule to the Legislature only....");
see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We The Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 5, 48-49 (2001) (arguing that ultimate interpretive authority over the Constitu-
tion rests with the people, who can check unconstitutional legislation by removing their
elected representatives).
112. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA 2009) ("[I]t will
not follow from [the Supremacy Clause] that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant
to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller
societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation
113. Id. ("If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority ...
the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such
measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and pru-
dence justify.").
114. See BRUTUS XV (1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 304, 307 (Ralph Ketcham ed., Mentor 1986) (argu-
ing that the Constitution had authorized the justices to nullify legislation based "not only
according to the natural and ob[vious] meaning of the [Constitution's] words, but also accord-
ing to the spirit and intention of it"); see also Kramer, supra note 11, at 67-68 (explaining
how Brutus's essay provided the context for Federalist No. 78); Shlomo Slonim, Federalist
No. 78 and Brutus'Neglected Thesis on Judicial Supremacy, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 7 (2006)
(same).
115. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 285 (James Madison) (ABA 2009) ("The
several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission,
neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the
boundaries between their respective powers.").
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one must wonder why the president and Congress are not equally entitled to
disregard the Supreme Court judgments that they consider repugnant to the
Constitution. Yet the justices expect and demand that their decisions be en-
forced and obeyed, no matter how strongly the political branches disapprove
of their constitutional reasoning. In this world of judgment finality, the jus-
tices should allocate interpretive authority over the Constitution in a manner
that respects the stature of the other branches as coordinate and independent
branches. There are many possible ways in which this could be done. Prior
to Marbury, most state and federal courts limited their judicial-review pre-
rogatives to laws directly affecting the judiciary, such as laws defining the
authority of juries or the jurisdiction of the courts." 6 Outside of that area,
both state and federal courts declined to second-guess the political branches'
interpretations of constitutional provisions.' T Justice Story's Commentaries
on the Constitution sketches another approach to the allocation of interpre-
tive authority. While Story strongly endorsed judicial supremacy and the
binding nature of the Supreme Court's judgments and opinions,1 18 he simul-
taneously cut a wide swath for the political-questions doctrine, arguing that
the political branches' decisions regarding the scope of the taxing, spending,
commerce, and treaty powers should be final and nonreviewable in court. 1 9
All of this indicates that textualists need not construe Article VI to require
nullification of every act of Congress that contradicts the original meaning
of a constitutional provision. Rather, the Supremacy Clause permits the jus-
tices (and presidents) to treat at least some federal statutes as the final and
authoritative exposition of the Constitution's meaning.2 ° These hybrid
116. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 84, at 455 (collecting authorities).
117. Id.; see also BICKEL, supra note 13, at 7. This early judicial practice mirrors the
modem presidents' selective use of their nonenforcement prerogatives, where they (generally)
enforce and defend all federal statutes unless they infringe the constitutional powers of the
executive branch.
118. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES
AND STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 383 (Melville M. Bigelow ed.,
Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1905) (1833) (asserting that the federal judiciary's interpretation
of the Constitution "becomes obligatory and conclusive upon all the departments of the Feder-
al government, and upon the whole people, so far as their rights and duties are derived from,
or affected by that Constitution").
119. Id. § 374 (arguing that the scope of these powers involves "measures exclusively of
a political, legislative, or executive character," and insisting that "the supreme authority, as to
these questions, belongs to the legislative and executive departments, they cannot be re-
examined elsewhere"); id. ("[Tlhese powers can never become the subject of re-examination
in any other tribunal.").
120. Article V, of course, indicates that Congress cannot amend the Constitution with
simple lawmaking, and some have suggested that this provision counsels in favor of broad,
Marbury-style judicial review. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 69, at 347-48. But a Supreme
Court ruling that sustains an unconstitutional federal statute will not establish a de facto con-
stitutional amendment because Congress always retains the prerogative to repeal that statute
through the ordinary bicameralism-and-presentment processes. Attributing finality to a federal
statute's interpretation of a constitutional provision is no more constitutionally objectionable
than the political branches' longstanding practice of respecting the finality of federal-court
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approaches respect Congress and the executive as coordinate branches by
vesting them with final interpretive authority over the Constitution in at least
some (though not all) situations.
Finally, other constitutional provisions make it hard to infer that the
Constitution compels the justices to invalidate every unconstitutional federal
statute that they encounter. To begin, the document gives the federal judici-
ary only partial independence from Congress and the president. Article III
judges may enjoy life tenure and salary protection, but the national political
branches still retain control over the appointment process to the courts, the
jurisdiction of the courts, the number of seats on the courts, the appropria-
tions for staffing the courts, any decisions to increase judicial salaries, and,
finally, the impeachment process. Interpreting the Constitution to require
Supreme Court justices to nullify every federal statute that they deem re-
pugnant to the Constitution-without any regard for the views of
Congress-would make judicial review self-defeating. Eventually, the na-
tional political branches will respond by using their appointment
prerogatives and other powers to bring the Court more into line with their
views.121 Indeed, the Court throughout its history has shown forbearance
when reviewing congressional legislation. The justices upheld the Jefferso-
nians' decision to repeal the 1801 Judiciary Act even though Chief Justice
Marshall and Justice Chase privately believed it to be unconstitutional,
122
and the Supreme Court failed to nullify any congressional legislation in the
years between Marbury v. Madison and Dred Scott v. Sanford. In addition,
the Supreme Court cannot even opine on the constitutionality of federal leg-
islation until an Article III case or controversy reaches its docket. A
Constitution that mandates robust, autonomous judicial review of congres-
sional enactments would do more to ensure the courts' involvement earlier
in the process, before the disputed legislation engenders reliance interests
that may complicate the Court's task. 23
judgments, even when they believe them to rest on mistaken interpretations of the Constitu-
tion.
121. See Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1557, 1561 (2002) (noting the view that judicial review does not invalidate federal
statutes, but merely delays their effectiveness "until the process of presidential appointment
aligns the Court's holdings with the nation's wishes").
122. See Letter from Justice Marshall to Justice Paterson (Apr. 6, 1802), in 6 THE PA-
PERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 105, 106 (Charles F Hobson ed., 1990) (questioning the
constitutionality of the repealing statute); Letter from Justice Marshall to Judge William Cush-
ing (Apr. 19, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra, at 108, 108 (expressing
"more than doubt" regarding the constitutionality of the repealing statute); Letter from Justice
Chase to Justice Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra, at
109, 109-16 (opining that the repealing statute was unconstitutional).
123. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 136-37 (1893) ("As the opportunity of the judges to
check and correct unconstitutional Acts is so limited, it may help us to understand why the
extent of their control, when they do have the opportunity, should also be narrow."). For a
different view of the pervasiveness and value of preventive adjudication, see Samuel L. Bray,
Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHi. L. REV. 1275 (2010).
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The sounder textualist interpretation of Article VI permits the justices to
enforce at least some acts of Congress that they believe to be unconstitu-
tional--either by respecting certain acts of Congress as the final and
authoritative construction of constitutional provisions, or by conferring "su-
premacy" on statutes that survive the bicameralism-and-presentment
processes (leaving textualist justices with freedom to decide whether to en-
force the original meaning of the "supreme" Constitution or the "supreme"
federal statutes). None of this implies that the Constitution categorically
forbids judicial review of federal statutes, nor does it mean that Marbury
was wrongly decided. Constitutional rules imply enforcement mechanisms,
and one can reasonably infer that the Constitution at least permits the Su-
preme Court (as well as the president) to disregard federal statutes that they
deem unconstitutional as an incident to their powers to resolve cases (or to
faithfully execute the laws). The Constitution lacks any provision that ex-
plicitly enshrines acts of Congress as final and binding pronouncements of
constitutional meaning, 124 and there are many statements from delegates at
the federal convention and the state ratifying conventions, as well as
members of the First Congress, assuming or approving the notion that
courts would review the constitutionality of federal statutes (although not
everyone shared this view). 125 But there is a great distance between the
124. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA 2009) ("If it be
said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and
that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be
answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any
particular provisions in the Constitution."); Harrison, supra note 69, at 333 (defending judicial
review after concluding that no constitutional provision compels courts or the executive to
treat all federal statutes as authoritative constructions of the Constitution).
125. See, e.g., DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOLUME 2, supra note 103, at 517 (recording
James Wilson's remarks at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, which insisted that the
courts would "declare ... void" any congressional enactment that exceeded the federal gov-
ernment's powers); 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA 1431 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) (record-
ing John Marshall's statement at the Virginia ratifying convention predicting that courts would
"declare ... void" an unconstitutional federal statute). When the members of the First Con-
gress debated the "Decision of 1789" regarding the scope of the president's removal power, as
well as the 1789 Judiciary Act, they assumed that the courts would independently assess the
constitutionality of their legislation. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 97 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (noting that Elbridge Gerry opposed the proposed
Council of Revision in the Virginia Plan, on the ground that federal judges "will have a suffi-
cient check agst. encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws,
which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality"); see also DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 120 (1997) ("Re-
peatedly and without contradiction, members of the First Congress acknowledged that the
constitutionality of their actions would be subject to judicial review.").
At least two delegates to the Philadelphia convention disapproved the notion of judicial
review. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 298 (noting
Francis Mercer's disapproval of "the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution
should have authority to declare a law void"); id. at 299 (noting that John Dickenson "thought
no such power [of judicial review] ought to exist"). These disagreements, as well as the con-
troversies surrounding state courts that deployed judicial review prior to the Constitution, may
explain why the written Constitution never explicitly endorses or repudiates judicial review of
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acknowledgement that the Constitution allows for judicial review and the
misguided insistence that it compels the justices to nullify every federal
statute that contravenes the Constitution. Unlike the explicit Article VI obli-
gation to review the constitutionality of state laws, the power to disregard a
federal statute on constitutional grounds is a discretionary and implied pow-
er rather than a mandatory and explicit one. The same is true of the
president's nonenforcement power over federal statutes; the Constitution
may permit the president to cease enforcing congressional enactments that
he deems unconstitutional, but presidents do not violate the Constitution or
their Oath of Office if they choose to enforce and defend all acts of Con-
gress--even when they sincerely believe that a statute contravenes the
Constitution.'26 Indeed, the Constitution would become a suicide pact if it
obligated the president and the justices to ignore the views of Congress and
plow ahead with their autonomous constructions of constitutional provi-
sions; the Constitution gives Congress too many weapons to check these
institutions when they elect to ignore congressional legislation, and the
branches would be at continual war with each other. Instead, the text and
structure of the Constitution set the stage for the three coordinate branches
to reach accommodations over the allocation of interpretive authority.
A textualist Supreme Court justice must therefore devise a method for
resolving cases that present conflicts between the original meaning of the
"supreme" Constitution and a "supreme" act of Congress. 27 Article VI does
not compel the Supreme Court to invalidate every federal statute that con-
tradicts its understanding of the Constitution, and it permits textualist jurists
to sort the cases in which they will treat the federal statute as the final and
authoritative exposition of the Constitution's meaning from those in which
they will impose their textualist interpretations of the Constitution against
the interpretations adopted by Congress. And this is where stare decisis
comes into play. Returning to Wickard and Raich, an original-meaning tex-
tualist may be certain that Wickard erred yet still vote to reject the
constitutional challenge in Raich-and maintain fidelity to the written doc-
ument-by adopting the following rationale:
congressional enactments, leaving the matter largely to inference. Cf U.S. CONST. art. VI
(explicitly requiring courts to subordinate state law to the Constitution).
126. Some departmentalists insist that the president's Oath of Office forbids him to defer
to the constitutional interpretations adopted by Congress or the Supreme Court and obligates a
president to interpret the Constitution de novo when deciding whether to enforce a federal
statute. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned from
Dr. Seuss, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 381 (2001). But nothing in the president's Oath of
Office compels the president to exercise independent interpretive authority over the Constitu-
tion. Like the Constitution itself, the Oath is silent on how to allocate final interpretive
authority over the Constitution among the three branches of the federal government. Many
different approaches can be squared with the constitutional text and with the Oath.
127. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 111, at 13 ("Nothing in the doctrine of judicial su-
premacy ... [denies] legitimate interpretive authority on political actors as a means of
ensuring continued popular input in shaping constitutional meaning. The trick, of course, is to
find the proper balance, a problem courts have struggled with throughout American history.").
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I do not believe that the Constitution, properly construed, authorizes Con-
gress to regulate the wholly intrastate consumption of home-grown
agricultural products. And the Constitution, of course, is the supreme law
of the land; it must prevail over anything we have said in our prior opin-
ions. But the Constitution does not obligate courts to nullify every
unconstitutional federal statute. First, Article VI designates federal statutes
as "supreme" law, and, second, these congressional enactments represent
the constitutional interpretations of a coordinate branch. So I must there-
fore decide which of these "supreme" laws should prevail in this case, or,
to put it another way, whether the courts or the national political branches
should have the final word on the constitutionality of this statute. Our stare
decisis doctrines provide a constitutionally permissible and publicly ac-
ceptable means of breaking this deadlock, and overturning Wickard would
destabilize the law and undermine reliance interests. So I will in this case
opt to enforce the "supreme" federal statute-the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause adopted by the national political branches--over the
equally "supreme" original meaning of the Commerce Clause.
A textualist justice may therefore invoke stare decisis to uphold a federal
statute-even a statute that conflicts with the Constitution's original mean-
ing-without violating his interpretive commitments. This practice is
troubling only for those who assume that the Constitution obligates the jus-
tices to subordinate acts of Congress to their constitutional interpretations; if
one accepts this assumption, a textualist cannot accommodate stare decisis
in these situations without surrendering to legal pragmatism. But the text of
the Constitution imposes no such requirement on the justices.
To be sure, this rationalization of stare decisis creates some tension with
the Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury, which assumed that the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Constitution must prevail over a contrary act of
Congress. But this does not undermine the legality of stare decisis. First,
although the justices must obey the written Constitution, they are not
obligated to follow the interpretive gloss that they place on it. Supreme
Court opinions are not listed among the "supreme" laws described in
Article VI-they are, after all, called opinions-and the Supreme Court has
always retained the prerogative to modify, trim, or overrule its earlier pro-
nouncements.1 8 Indeed, numerous aspects of the Marbury opinion (apart
from its discussion of judicial review) have already been repudiated by the
Supreme Court.
129
128. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
129. Compare Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 392-405 (1821) (holding that
Congress may confer appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court even in cases where Article
III, § 2 provides for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court), with Marbury, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) at 174 (holding that Article III forbids Congress either to give the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction where the Constitution provides for appellate, or to give it appellate juris-
diction where the Constitution provides for original); compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-102 (1998) (forbidding Article III courts to resolve disputed
questions of law when subject-matter jurisdiction is in doubt), with Marbury, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) at 154-68 (reaching the merits of the dispute and holding that the Jefferson
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Second, the proper scope of the Marbury power remains in flux; the jus-
tices are constantly tussling over the extent of their power to invalidate
unconstitutional federal statutes. Sometimes this is explicit, as in the debates
over the "political-questions doctrine" or the "political safeguards of feder-
alism."' 30 Numerous cases now recognize that the national political branches
have the final say in many areas of constitutional interpretation, 131 such as
the division of war powers between Congress and the president'3 2 and the
meaning of the Republican Form of Government Clause.'33 Other times this
is implicit, as in cases where textualist justices invoke stare decisis to uphold
a federal statute that contravenes the original meaning of constitutional text.
Any Supreme Court opinion that invokes stare decisis to uphold a federal
statute against constitutional challenge can be translated to say: "We think
this federal statute might contravene a constitutional provision, but we need
not resolve that question because the Constitution permits us to enforce
Congress's interpretation of the Constitution in this case." On this view,
stare decisis is no different from a tacit expansion of the political-questions
doctrine, a ruling that grows the domain of interpretive questions to be re-
solved authoritatively by the national political branches. A textualist can
embrace this role for stare decisis without compromising his interpretive
commitments.
Some may think that this theory of stare decisis proves too much. If the
text of the Constitution allows the justices to expand or contract the scope of
the Marbury power based on the consequentialist considerations that under-
gird stare decisis doctrines, then this prerogative should exist in every case
presenting constitutional challenges to federal statutes, regardless of wheth-
er stare decisis is in play. Even in a case of first impression, a textualist
might want to reject a constitutional challenge to an unconstitutional federal
statute merely because he wants to avoid impeachment or public backlash,
or because he likes the statute as a policy matter. All of these seemingly law-
Administration unlawfully withheld Marbury's commission, and only later resolving whether
the Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction over the controversy).
130. Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-55 (2000) (Souter, J., dis-
senting), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-57 (1985), with
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-27 (majority opinion), and Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580-89 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). In his Morrison majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist accused his dissent-
ing colleagues of retreating from Marbury by embracing the "political safeguards of
federalism" theory. Rehnquist was right to characterize the "political safeguards" rationale as
a retreat from Marbury, but he was wrong to suggest that there was anything lawless about
that. Stare decisis likewise represents a retreat from Marbury when invoked to uphold an un-
constitutional federal statute. Each of these practices is lawful because the justices need only
obey the written Constitution, not the Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements, and the doc-
ument does not obligate the justices to nullify unconstitutional federal statutes.
131. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Con-
gress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1283-85 (2001) (documenting the categories of constitutional
interpretive questions that are vested in political branches rather than courts).
132. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611,616 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Campbell v. Clinton, 203
F.3d 19, 24-28 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring).
133. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 147-51 (1912).
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less dispositions could be rationalized as decisions that merely tweak the
scope of Marbury. And if textualism licenses the Supreme Court to turn
aside any constitutional challenge to a federal statute, then it would seem to
confer a discretionary power even greater than the latitude provided by con-
ventional stare decisis doctrines-at least in the subset of cases involving
federal statutes that conflict with the Constitution.
But the Supreme Court operates under other constraints-both practical
and legalistic-that prevent this theory of stare decisis from degenerating
into a regime where the justices uphold federal statutes whenever they
please. First, the Supreme Court must supply reasons when it decides cases,
and public obedience to the Court depends on the justices' ability to defend
their rulings with publicly acceptable rationales.'34 When the Court invokes
stare decisis to uphold an act of Congress, it is claiming that its previous
ruling suffices to reject the constitutional challenge, regardless of whether
the federal statute actually conflicts with a proper interpretation of the Con-
stitution. Reasoning from precedent in this manner has become an accepted
justification for legal decisionmaking; it also comports with textualist under-
standings of the Constitution because judicial review of federal statutes is a
discretionary rather than mandatory power. Although it is possible to imag-
ine other constitutionally permissible algorithms for deciding when to
invoke the Marbury power, they will not be implemented if they would un-
dermine the Court's stature or credibility.
Second, even when the Constitution leaves the Supreme Court with a
discretionary power, it does not follow that the justices may exercise that
power in a nakedly political or results-oriented manner. Implicit in "the ju-
dicial power,"'13 5 and explicit in the judicial Oath, 3 6 is a prohibition on
arbitrary or results-driven judging, as well as an obligation to decide cases
with reasonably neutral principles.'37 An acknowledgement that the Consti-
tution allows the Supreme Court to adjust the scope of its power to review
federal statutes does not absolve the justices of their responsibilities to base
their decisions on doctrines or principles that transcend the outcome in a
particular case.
Finally, one can still rely on sub-constitutional norms to criticize or de-
nounce a decision not to invoke the Marbury prerogative. A ruling that
declines to nullify an unconstitutional federal statute may be imprudent,
pernicious, or opportunistic--even if it complies with the external bounda-
ries established by constitutional text. And textualist interpretive theories
allow ample room for the evolution of sub-constitutional norms, such as
tradition, norms of reciprocity, and stare decisis doctrines, that provide
134. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 349, 373
(1992) ("The need to persuade society to obey sets bounds on judicial creativity.").
135. See U.S. CONST. art. iII.
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (requiring federal judges to swear or affirm that they will ad-
minister justice "without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich").
137. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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standards for judging the Supreme Court's use of its discretionary Marbury
powers. The lack of constitutionally mandated rules should not be equated
with an absence of any criteria for evaluating and critiquing Supreme Court
rulings that reject constitutional challenges to federal statutes. The point is
only that these criteria are external to the Constitution, and are directed to a
judge's sense of prudence rather than his notions of legal obligation. Any
textualist justice who invokes stare decisis to uphold an unconstitutional
federal statute can do so with a clear constitutional conscience.
2. Invoking Precedent to Invalidate a Federal Statute
The previous subsection showed that the Supremacy Clause permits the
justices to invoke stare decisis, but only when they reject constitutional chal-
lenges to federal statutes or treaties. It's a different story when the Supreme
Court uses stare decisis to sustain a litigant's challenge to an act of Con-
gress. In these cases, the justices invalidate a federal statute solely because it
conflicts with a previously decided Supreme Court ruling--even if the stat-
ute comports with a proper textualist interpretation of the Constitution.
Consider the Court's rulings on state sovereign immunity. Hans v. Loui-
siana"'38 held that the Constitution prohibits individuals from suing states in
federal court unless the state consents to suit; this sovereign immunity at-
taches even when the plaintiff is a citizen of that state and sues under the
federal-question jurisdiction. Hans's analysis is controversial. Its holding
finds no support in the Eleventh Amendment's text, which applies only
when a state is sued by "[c]itizens of another State."'39 And the originalist
evidence surrounding the framers' and ratifiers' support for state sovereign
immunity is more varied and nuanced than the grounds that the Court in-
voked for its ruling. 4° Let us assume, again for the sake of argument, that
Hans was wrongly decided, and consider whether a textualist could never-
theless invoke stare decisis and use Hans to invalidate an act of Congress.
In this situation, the Supremacy Clause will constrain a textualist jus-
tice's ability to use stare decisis. The Supremacy Clause recognizes federal
statutes as "the supreme Law of the Land," so long as they are enacted "in
Pursuance" of the Constitution. If Congress enacts legislation that complies
with the Constitution's substantive provisions, then the Supremacy Clause
leaves no room for a textualist to invalidate that statute on the ground that it
conflicts with an earlier, wrongly decided Supreme Court precedent. The
only way that a textualist could refuse to enforce an act of Congress is if it
conflicts with another "supreme" law, such as a treaty or federal constitu-
tional provision. In those types of cases-where two supreme laws conflict,
138. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added); see also John F Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1680-81 (2004).
140. Even Hans's academic defenders acknowledge this point. See DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 7-9
(1990). For criticism of Hans, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1476 (1987).
[Vol. 110:1
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text
or where the justices must decide whether Congress or the Supreme Court
should hold final interpretive authority over a constitutional issue-the writ-
ten Constitution does not resolve which should prevail, so the justices do not
violate Article VI, nor do textualist jurists violate their interpretive commit-
ments, if they invoke stare decisis to uphold a federal statute over the
Constitution's original meaning.
But textualists, by equating "[t]his Constitution" with the original mean-
ing of its words, cannot regard Supreme Court precedents as "the supreme
Law of the Land" unless those earlier decisions represent proper textualist
interpretations of the Constitution. And although Article VI can be read to
confer supremacy on the constitutional interpretations that the political
branches memorialize in federal statutes or treaties, it does not give this sta-
tus to the views that the Supreme Court expresses in its opinions."' The
Supremacy Clause requires federal courts to enforce congressional legisla-
tion and treaties when they comply with the Constitution, properly
interpreted. This is where Professor Lawson's Supremacy Clause arguments
against stare decisis have real bite. Wrongly decided judicial precedents are
(at best) nonsupreme rules of decision, and a textualist justice violates Arti-
cle VI if he uses them to displace a "supreme" federal statute or treaty that
otherwise complies with the Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause thus provides for an asymmetric regime of stare
decisis. There are no plausible constitutional objections when the Supreme
Court uses stare decisis as a shield, by invoking wrongly decided precedents
to turn aside constitutional challenges to federal statutes or treaties. But the
Supremacy Clause limits a textualist justice's authority to invoke stare deci-
sis as a sword; he cannot decline to enforce an act of Congress or a treaty
provision merely because it conflicts with a wrongly decided Supreme
Court ruling. A textualist may still consult Hans v. Louisiana for its epistem-
ic value in finding the right answer to a disputed constitutional question. But
he cannot treat Hans as an authoritative rule of decision if Hans misinter-
preted the Constitution-unless he surrenders to pragmatism and allows
policy-driven consequentialist analysis to trump constitutional text and his-
tory. Stare decisis is incompatible with textualist interpretive methodologies
when it allows a nonsupreme judicial precedent to prevail over federal stat-
utes or treaties that comply with a proper interpretation of the Constitution.
An entirely different framework applies to the relationship between stare
decisis and constitutional challenges to state laws. State law falls outside the
"supreme" laws that Article VI describes. And that makes all the difference
for stare decisis analysis. Section II.B.3 considers whether the Constitution
allows the Supreme Court to rely on wrongly decided precedents to reject
federal constitutional challenges to state law. Section II.B.4 will explore
141. See generally Harrison, supra note 10.
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whether the Constitution constrains the use of stare decisis in rulings that
sustain challenges to state law.
3. Invoking Precedent to Uphold State Law
Plessy v. Ferguson142 held that the Fourteenth Amendment allows states
to mandate racial segregation on railroads. By the time of the Court's ruling
in Brown v. Board of Education,143 all nine justices had concluded that state-
mandated segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment. But the siren
song of stare decisis figured prominently in the Brown litigation; John W.
Davis's brief in the companion case of Briggs v. Elliott emphasized that
southern states had ordered their institutions around the Plessy Court's
blessing of racial segregation, and argued that these reliance interests coun-
seled in favor of retaining Plessy even if the Court no longer viewed it as a
proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.' If we assume, for the
sake of argument, that Plessy had indeed misconstrued the Fourteenth
Amendment, the question to consider is whether the justices could have re-
affirmed its separate-but-equal regime in the interests of maintaining
stability or protecting reliance interests.
In these situations, the Supremacy Clause establishes a clear hierarchy
for the Court to follow: the federal Constitution is a "supreme" law and state
law is not. The justices cannot allow a nonsupreme state law to prevail over
a federal constitutional command merely because an earlier-decided Su-
preme Court ruling had upheld similar laws against federal constitutional
challenge. So they cannot invoke stare decisis when upholding a state law
that would otherwise violate the proper interpretation of a federal constitu-
tional provision. If a textualist justice concludes that separate-but-equal
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning, he is not allowed to
adhere to Plessy and invert Article VI's hierarchy of laws simply by invok-
ing the policy concerns that underlie stare decisis doctrines.
Although the written Constitution leaves room for the Supreme Court to
enforce unconstitutional federal statutes and treaties, 145 it does not leave the
justices with any discretion when state laws contravene the Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause not only compels state law to give way when it con-
flicts with the Constitution, it also specifically imposes a duty on judges to
enforce this hierarchy. 4 6 And although the Constitution may permit the Su-
preme Court to respect federal statutes as final and conclusive resolutions of
constitutional meaning, it is not plausible for the Court to give state legisla-
tion the final word on what "the Constitution" means. To begin, the Article
142. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. Brief for Appellees on Reargument at 59-60, Briggs v. Elliott, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
145. See supra Section H.B. 1.
146. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judg-
es in every State shall be bound thereby... ) (emphasis added).
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VI requirement to subordinate state laws to the federal Constitution would
become little more than an option if the courts could designate state law-
makers as final expositors of the Constitution's meaning. The Supremacy
Clause also makes clear that state law is to be measured by a standard exter-
nal to the views of state lawmakers. All of this indicates that the
Constitution precludes courts from treating state lawmaking processes as the
conclusive resolution of constitutional meaning.
The Supremacy Clause therefore requires the justices to subordinate
state laws that conflict with "[t]his Constitution"; it leaves no room for them
to uphold an unconstitutional state law merely because they want to pre-
serve stability or reliance interests induced by previous Supreme Court
rulings upholding similar laws against constitutional challenge. This com-
pels textualists, who equate "[t]his Constitution" with the original meaning
of its words, to enforce that Constitution whenever a litigant challenges a
state law. Neither stare decisis considerations nor any other policy-driven
consequentialist rationales can excuse a textualist jurist's decision to subor-
dinate a federal constitutional provision to state law.
4. Invoking Precedent to Invalidate State Law
This is the last and most controversial of the four categories. The para-
digm case here is Lochner v. New York, 147 a precedent that is widely
disapproved and that also nullified a state law.148 The question is whether the
Constitution would constrain an early twentieth-century justice's ability to
invoke stare decisis and invalidate a state law for conflicting with Lochner-
on the assumption that Lochner misconstrued the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.
Of course, a textualist justice cannot invoke a wrongly decided ruling
such as Lochner to invalidate federal statutes. 149 But that is because Article
VI ordains federal statutes as the "supreme Law of the Land" whenever they
comport with the written Constitution. State laws do not share that lofty sta-
tus under Article VI, even when they comply with the Constitution. They are
laws, to be sure, but the Supremacy Clause does not specify their rank, nor
does it secure any status for state law in federal-court litigation. It com-
mands only that state law yield to the three categories of "supreme" law-
the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties. So does the
Constitution obligate the Supreme Court to follow state law in the absence
of conflict with one of the "supreme" laws? Or does it allow the justices to
displace state law with some other source of nonsupreme law in those situa-
tions?
147. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
148. Not quite everyone deems Lochner wrongly decided. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128-29 (1985);
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 113-25, 320-21 (1980).
Those who approve of Lochner can substitute a case from their own lists of worst Supreme
Court rulings invalidating a state law.
149. See supra Section I.B.2.
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These questions go all the way back to Calder v. Bull,15 ° where Justice
Chase famously asserted that the Supreme Court need not apply or enforce
state laws that conflict with "the general principles of law and reason."'' He
stated that when a law "takes property from A[] and gives it to B," or
"makes a man a Judge in his own cause," the Supreme Court may resort to
"general principles" rather than state law as the rule of decision.' Justice
Chase was not attempting to concoct a federal constitutional prohibition on
these types of laws; he nowhere invokes the Ninth Amendment or "substan-
tive due process" or any other provision in the Constitution. His argument
relies on what we now call "general law"--laws and principles that are not
tied to a particular sovereign's command yet nevertheless can supply rules
of decision for federal judges.
Is Justice Chase's approach compatible with the written Constitution?
Certainly not for cases involving challenges to federal statutes. These laws
are "supreme" so long as they comport with the Constitution. The "general
principles of law and reason" are (at best) a nonsupreme source of rule of
decision, so they cannot trump or in any way limit the scope of a constitu-
tional federal statute. But it's a trickier question when it comes to state law.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins'13 says that
Justice Chase's approach is impermissible; Erie envisions only two possible
rules of decision-"supreme" federal law and state law.' 54 But Erie, like
Marbury, is merely the Supreme Court's interpretive gloss on the Constitu-
tion, and one cannot judge the legality of stare decisis by assuming the
correctness of a Supreme Court precedent. We must instead consider wheth-
er the text of the Constitution compels the Supreme Court to apply state law
whenever it complies with the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties.
The answer is no. Again, return to the language of Article VI. The Su-
premacy Clause establishes a two-tiered hierarchy, with the Constitution,
treaties, and federal statutes "supreme" and all other laws nonsupreme. But
Article VI does not establish or imply any rank among the nonsupreme
sources of law, which include state law, foreign law, customary international
law, general common law, natural law, and judicial precedents. All of these
laws are jockeying for position below the supremacy line; the Supremacy
Clause leaves open the issue of priority among these nonsupreme rules of
decision. And although the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states powers
"not delegated to the United States,""' the Constitution explicitly delegates
to the federal judiciary the power to decide the "Cases" and "Controversies"
listed in Article III. The case-deciding power necessarily includes a power to
choose or create the rules of decision; that's how the federal courts resolve
150. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
151. Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted).
152. Id. (emphasis omitted).
153. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
154. Id. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.").
155. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text
admiralty cases, 56 and it's also how the Supreme Court resolves the inter-
state controversies that fall within its original jurisdiction.'57 The Supremacy
Clause limits the Supreme Court's discretion in these choice-of-law matters,
but it requires only that the justices prefer the three categories of "supreme"
law over nonsupreme laws. It does not establish any status for state law in
federal-court decisionmaking, and it is silent on the hierarchy between state
law and general law created by judges.15
But then there is the Supreme Court's analysis in Erie, which claims that
the Constitution prohibits federal courts from applying anything other than
state law as rules of decision-unless the state law conflicts with the Consti-
tution, a federal statute, or a treaty provision. 15 9 The Erie Court issued this
pronouncement even though the parties to the case never argued it, and its
opinion exhibits the characteristics of court rulings that reach out to decide
issues without the benefit of adversarial briefing.1 60 Like Marbury, the Erie
opinion begs the crucial question in the case; it assumes that state law
should outrank all the other sources of nonsupreme law when the text of the
Constitution nowhere compels such a regime. Erie also neglects to discuss
or even mention the many categories of nonsupreme and nonstate-law rules
of decision that federal courts have long applied, besides the general com-
mercial law that originated in Swift v. Tyson. 16 1 One of these was customary
international law, or the law of nations. Erie omits any discussion of how
customary international law might fit into its framework, leaving everyone
at sea as to its post-Erie status. It is hard to squeeze customary international
law into the supreme "laws of the United States" when it has not been
156. See, e.g., Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648,651-52 (1953).
157. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931); WRIGHT &
KANE, supra note 16, at 413-14.
158. Professor Clark argues that the Supremacy Clause allows only the "Constitution,"
the "Laws of the United States," and "Treaties" to displace state laws. See Bradford R. Clark,
Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1289-90 (2007). That is not, however,
what the Supremacy Clause says. It designates three categories of "supreme" federal law, and
it commands state law to yield to those laws. This does not preserve any status for state law
vis-a-vis the other sources of nonsupreme law. Of course, the Constitution still permits the
justices to elevate state law above all other sources of nonsupreme laws, and Professor Clark's
approach has great appeal to those who value federalism and distrust judicial discretion. But
this is a prudential issue of policy, not a constitutional command. Other policy concerns, such
as the need to promote stability and reliance interests, might be invoked to justify a different
approach in other cases.
159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
160. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4505, at 50-54 (2d ed. 1996) (criticizing Erie's constitutional analysis as "remarkably ab-
breviated" and "puzzling"). Other commentators have criticized the Erie opinion's tendentious
analysis of the legislative history of the Rules of Decision Act. See, e.g., Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 903-04 (1986);
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1514-15 (1984); Henry J. Friend-
ly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.YU. L. REV. 383, 388-89
(1964).
161. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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codified in a federal statute or treaty.162 But neither does it seem tenable to
characterize it as state common law; this would disable federal courts from
construing the law of nations and bind them to the interpretations of state
institutions. 163 The most plausible view is that customary international law
retains its pre-Erie status as general law, 164 a court-discovered rule of deci-
sion that is neither "supreme" federal law nor state law. This approach
preserves the federal courts' ability to apply international-law doctrines such
as consular immunity and head-of-state immunity, without compelling the
courts to subordinate state law to international-human-rights norms on is-
sues such as capital punishment or prison conditions.
65
The Supreme Court's erroneous constitutional precedents represent
another category of nonsupreme and nonstate-law rules of decision that
post-Erie courts continue to apply. Of course, when a Supreme Court opin-
ion correctly interprets the Constitution, its status is no different from the
Constitution itself: it must displace state laws to the contrary and courts may
(but need not) use it to trump federal statutes and treaties. But when a judi-
cial precedent misconstrues the Constitution, one cannot equate that ruling
with "[t]his Constitution" or "the laws of the United States"-at least not
without rejecting the textualists' core premise that the judiciary derives its
power from the formal ratification of constitutional language and is bound to
the understandings that prevailed at the time of enactment. When the justic-
es apply their mistaken precedents under the auspices of stare decisis, they
are applying rules of decision that are neither "supreme" federal law nor
"state" law. These precedents have the same legal status as the "general law"
that the federal courts applied prior to Erie-yet the Supreme Court contin-
ues to apply today.
None of this means that the Erie Court erred when it decided to abolish
a subset of general common law, namely, the general commercial law that
162. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 819 & n.20
(1997) (noting that Article VI designates "treaties" as the supreme law of the land but omits
any reference to customary international law).
163. See, e.g., Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939) ("It would be as unsound as it would
be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of interna-
tional law."); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 461 (2002) (noting that divergent state interpretations of the doctrines of
consular immunity and head-of-state immunity would "obviously have the potential to com-
plicate American foreign relations and undermine the ability of the federal Executive to
conduct foreign policy").
164. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary inter-
national law is "part of our law," which federal courts should apply as a rule of decision
"where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision"
on point).
165. The latter result logically follows from the widely held "modern" (and post-Erie)
position that equates customary international law with "supreme" federal law. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 162, at 818.
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Swift v. Tyson had spawned.166 That the written Constitution allows courts to
apply nonsupreme rules of decision over state law in no way implies that
they must or should, and the Swift v. Tyson regime had engendered practical
problems by producing incentives for vertical forum shopping and inequita-
ble treatment of similarly situated litigants.167 But Erie's decision to shrink
the domain of general common law has three implications for the constitu-
tionality of stare decisis. First, Erie (like Marbury) reflects a judicial policy
choice rather than a constitutional command. The Constitution permits the
Supreme Court to give state law priority over other sources of nonsupreme
law, but it does not require this. Erie has become so ingrained that few can
even conceive that the Constitution's text might leave room for courts to
apply nonsupreme, nonstate law as rules of decision-but it does.
Second, Erie (again, like Marbury) has a settled core and a disputed pe-
riphery. Erie's core prohibits federal courts from using the judge-created
commercial-law doctrines from Swift v. Tyson to displace state law in diver-
sity litigation. Yet today many take Erie to establish a more categorical
principle that state law must always prevail over all other nonsupreme rules
of decision, including customary international law' 68 and wrongly decided
constitutional precedents. 169 But one need not endorse that overly broad
proposition to preserve the Court's judgment in Erie, which rested as much
on the unworkability of the Swift v. Tyson regime as it did on the Court's
cursory discussion of the constitutional issues, 170 and which never consid-
ered or discussed the implications of its holding for customary international
law, admiralty or interstate law, or constitutional stare decisis.
Finally, and most importantly, the Erie opinion (like Marbury) is noth-
ing more than the Supreme Court's interpretive gloss on ambiguous
constitutional provisions. As far as textualism is concerned, the justices re-
main free to adopt stare decisis practices that undermine or conflict with the
Erie opinion, just as they can use stare decisis policies that deviate from
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury. The justices must obey the
external legal constraints imposed by those who ratified the Constitution's
language; they are not similarly obligated to follow the self-imposed con-
straints derived from their earlier rulings.
166. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-78 (1938).
167. See id. at 74-75. Under the Swift v. Tyson regime, litigants sued in state court were
judged by state common law, while those sued in federal diversity courts were subject to the
federal general common law. This gave noncitizens significant forum-shopping advantages
over in-state litigants, because 28 U.S.C. § 1444(b) blocks in-state defendants from removing
diversity cases to federal court.
168. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 162, at 852-53 (arguing that "all law
applied by federal courts must be either federal law or state law" and that a "federal court can
no longer apply [customary international law] in the absence of some domestic authorization
to do so").
169. See generally Lawson, The Constitutional Case, supra note II (assuming that the
Constitution obligates the Supreme Court to enforce state laws if they comport with the Con-
stitution and "supreme" federal law).
170. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-78.
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Now suppose that a textualist Supreme Court justice must decide wheth-
er to follow or overrule Lochner in a case presenting a constitutional
challenge to a state law. Stare decisis enables him to assume Lochner's cor-
rectness, even if it misconstrued the Constitution, and use it as a rule of
decision in constitutional litigation. But here is how the Constitution author-
izes this maneuver: Lochner is either a correct interpretation of the
Constitution, in which case the Supreme Court must apply it, or the Lochner
opinion is general common law-a court-created rule of decision that lacks
any nexus to the Constitution, federal statutes, or treaties. In the latter situa-
tion, the Supreme Court must choose between applying state law and apply-
applying Lochner-as-general-common-law. But each of these sources of law
is nonsupreme, and Article VI imposes no requirement that the justices
choose state law over judicial precedent (or vice versa). A justice who prizes
federalism and dislikes judicial policymaking will likely prefer state law in
these situations, while a justice who is more concerned with promoting sta-
bility, reliance interests, and the other policies of stare decisis will opt for
the earlier-decided ruling. Either choice, however, is constitutionally per-
missible-the latter disposition creates tension only with the Erie opinion
and not with the written Constitution. When the Supreme Court invokes
stare decisis and uses a constitutional precedent to displace a state law, it is
saying that it need not decide whether the precedent belongs in the "federal
constitutional law" or "general common law" cubbyhole; under either, the
challenged state law gives way. The former because the Supremacy Clause
commands it, the latter because the Supremacy Clause does not forbid it.
The written Constitution does not compel the federal judiciary to apply state
law, and it permits the justices to subordinate state law to judge-made com-
mon-law doctrines, including the Supreme Court's erroneous constitutional
precedents.
This conclusion is not as staggering as it may seem.
First, the Supreme Court has been doing this from the get-go, from
M'Culloch v. Maryland17 all the way through modem substantive-due-
process jurisprudence. The examples of Supreme Court rulings that subor-
dinate state law to judge-created doctrines, in the absence of conflict
between state law and constitutional text, are legion-from Justice Chase's
seriatim opinion in Calder v. Bull,172 to the Dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence,"' to Swift v. Tyson,'74 to Lochner-era substantive due
process, 75 to the decisions subordinating state law to "executive agree-
171. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (invalidating a state tax on the operations of the
Bank of the United States, even though no provision in the Constitution or in any federal stat-
ute explicitly precluded states from taxing the bank).
172. See 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 386-95 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
173. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
174. See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
175. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ments,"'176 to the Warren Court's decisions establishing voting as a "funda-
mental" right, 17 7 to the doctrine of "dormant foreign affairs preemption."'
178
None of the state laws in these cases contradicted any language in the Con-
stitution, federal statutes, or treaties-yet the justices allowed judge-made
common-law doctrines rather than state law to supply the rule of decision.
True, most of these rulings purported to reflect constitutional decrees, but
the Court's efforts to derive these decisions from the text of the Constitution
range from feeble to farcical. The justices in these rulings are instead exer-
cising their constitutional prerogative to substitute court-created rules of
decision for state law. Whether one calls this "general law, ' 179 "natural
law,' 180 "inferences from structure,"'
81  "customary international law,"' 181
"dormant preemption," '183 "substantive due process," '84 "constitutional com-
mon law," '185 or "a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"' 186 they all amount to
the same thing: a prerogative to apply judge-made (or judge-discovered)
doctrines-rather than state law-as rules of decision in cases where the
state law nowhere conflicts with any provision of the "supreme" federal
laws delineated in Article VI.
Second, that the Constitution permits the justices to subordinate state
law to judge-created doctrines does not imply that they should or even will
do this. Nothing prevents the justices from forswearing this prerogative, in
part or in whole, for prudential reasons. The Erie ruling, for example, serves
as a precommitment device preventing the federal courts from resurrecting
the general commercial law that flourished in the nineteenth century. Some
formalists might want to go further, and adopt a regime that categorically
prohibits federal courts from displacing state-law with nonsupreme, judge-
created doctrines. And this notion of a per se prohibition on judge-created
176. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
177. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
178. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (invalidating an Oregon
probate statute solely because the Court deemed it "an intrusion by the State into the field of
foreign affairs," which the Court thought should be "entrust[ed] to the President and the Con-
gress" (citation omitted)); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003) (holding
that federal courts may invalidate state legislation that "will produce something more than
incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government").
179. See generally Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 1.
180. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 709 (1975).
181. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., Inference from Structure: The Neglected
Method, in STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (1969).
182. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
183. See generally Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429.
184. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
185. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
186. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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general common law is certainly defensible: it preserves values of federal-
ism and representative democracy, and it removes opportunities and
temptations for federal judges to denigrate state law merely because it con-
flicts with their personal beliefs. The justices will also have strong
incentives to disclaim at least some of their general-law powers given the
veil of ignorance that shrouds the future makeup of the Supreme Court.
(Could anyone have foreseen in 1968, at the high-water mark of the Warren
Court, that Republican presidents would make eleven consecutive Supreme
Court appointments?) If the conservative majority on the Roberts Court used
the rubric of "general law" as a license to subordinate progressive state laws
willy-nilly, it would embolden successor courts to engage in a similar ad hoc
disregard of state laws that conservatives favor. The inability to foresee the
outcomes of future elections, or the timing of Supreme Court retirements,
creates a world of mutually assured destruction that will dissuade even the
most rabidly partisan jurists from using general law as an excuse simply to
impose their will on the states. But a strategy of total forbearance when it
comes to general common law is not a regime that the constitutional text or
original understandings compel,'87 and textualist and originalist jurists can
carve out narrow exceptions for stare decisis (though only in cases that in-
validate state laws) without betraying their interpretive commitments.
Third, recognizing the Supreme Court's post-Erie general-common-law
powers offers a means for textualists and originalists to make peace with
Brown v. Board of Education188 and other canonical Supreme Court rulings
that are otherwise impossible to reconcile with their methods of constitu-
tional interpretation. The Equal Protection Clause, as originally understood,
did not prohibit segregated public schools, 18 9 so textualists face a cruel tri-
lemma: they can embrace strained historical arguments for Brown,190 create
a living-constitutionalism exception for Brown,191 or admit that Brown was
wrong.' 92 None of these options is appealing; whatever one chooses, one
will be deemed naive, unprincipled, or "outside the mainstream." Acknowl-
edging a limited role for general common law deftly avoids this trilemma.
187. It is also important to avoid the "perfect Constitution" fallacy, which assumes that
the Constitution must prohibit undesirable conduct while overlooking other mechanisms that
can prevent the abuses. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (rejecting "actual innocence" as a judicially enforceable constitutional claim because
"it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires would
fail to produce an executive pardon").
188. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
189. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1881, 1893 (1995); Strauss, supra note 42, at 304-06.
190. See Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education,
19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457 (1996).
191. This could be done either by arguing that the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause changed, or else by arguing that the Equal Protection Clause implicitly delegated pow-
er to future Supreme Courts to impose new visions of equality on the states. See BORK, supra
note 46, at 82-83.
192. E.g., VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 280.
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On this view, Brown is correct (or, at the very least, it is not wrong) for two
reasons. First, nothing in the written Constitution compels the Supreme
Court to apply state law over judge-created or judge-discovered doctrines.
Second, if ever a court could justify a decision to subordinate state law to
court-created doctrines, it is in cases like Brown, where segregationist state
laws had been produced by regimes that denied blacks the right to vote in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, depriving those state policies of any
democratic pedigree or constitutional legitimacy. Just as Swift v. Tyson cre-
ated a general common law to promote business relations, Brown and later
cases can be viewed as establishing a general common law of racial equali-
ty. Characterizing Brown in this manner may create some tension with Erie,
but other efforts to defend the outcome in Brown create tension with the
original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. For textualists and
originalists who want to preserve the outcome in Brown, this should not be a
difficult choice.
General common law also solves another nagging legitimacy problem
with the Supreme Court's race jurisprudence, which arises from the fact that
the Court waited nearly 100 years after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment before invalidating public-school segregation in the states. If
the ruling in Brown rests solely on the Equal Protection Clause, that means
either that: (a) the Supreme Court violated the Constitution by tolerating
racial segregation for the fifty-eight years between Plessy and Brown; (b) the
Supreme Court can change the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
without using Article V; or (c) the Equal Protection Clause authorizes the
Supreme Court to impose different visions of racial equality, depending on
what it sees fit at any given time. The difficulties in justifying the Court's
transition from Plessy to Brown dissolve as soon as one roots Brown in the
Supreme Court's general-law powers, because general common law (unlike
the Constitution) can be changed by judges. Consider also the Supreme
Court's delayed actions against state anti-miscegenation laws. If the Equal
Protection Clause truly prohibits states from banning interracial marriage,
then the Court's decision in Naim v. Naim'93 to dismiss the constitutional
challenge to state anti-miscegenation laws by concocting a jurisdictional
defect was not only cowardly but lawless. 194 Article VI does not permit the
justices to subordinate a constitutional mandate to state law so that the jus-
tices can preserve their political capital or their self-serving reputational
concerns. Reconceiving the Court's racial-equality jurisprudence as general
common law legitimizes all of these maneuvers, and at only a small cost-at
the cost of disabling the justices from entrenching these rulings against
override by an act of Congress or a treaty. Any jurist who secretly doubts
whether Brown properly interpreted the Equal Protection Clause can confi-
dently apply Brown and related cases on stare decisis grounds (at least when
it comes to state law) without violating any obligations that he might have to
193. 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
194. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 140-64 (discussing Naim).
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the original meaning of constitutional language.'95 The same goes for other
ahistorical precedents that nullify state law yet would be unthinkable for
even the most dogmatic originalists to overrule; these include Loving v. Vir-
ginia,"96 Reynolds v. Sims, 197  Griswold v. Connecticut,"' Gideon v.
Wainwright,'99 modem sex-equality jurisprudence,200 and modem free-
speech jurisprudence.210 The only caveat is that a textualist or originalist
jurist cannot use these precedents to invalidate an act of Congress or a trea-
ty.
Finally, recognizing that the Constitution permits the Supreme Court to
substitute principles of general common law for state law does not license
the justices to displace state law at whim, nor does it give them a roving
Madisonian veto over state legislation. Veil-of-ignorance mechanisms will
induce the justices to rely on neutral principles rather than raw partisan-
ship.2"2 And Article III, by vesting federal courts with "the judicial power,"
implies a responsibility to develop rules of decision for resolving cases in a
principled and incremental manner, resembling the common-law processes
that produced the Court's admiralty doctrines and the law governing inter-
state disputes.203 Some may notice affinities between this vision of general
law and the theories of common-law constitutional interpretation propound-
ed by Professor Strauss and other commentators. 204 But there are crucial
differences between recognizing atextual or nonoriginalist constitutional
precedents as general law and equating them with federal constitutional law,
as the adherents of common-law constitutional interpretation do.
First, this judge-created common law can never be used to invalidate an
act of Congress or a treaty provision, and the rulings are defeasible by con-
gressional legislation and treaties. Article VI compels this hierarchy: federal
statutes and treaties are "supreme" law, while general common law is non-
supreme. Common-law constitutionalism, for example, might allow the
195. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), is in a different category, because general
common law cannot trump an act of Congress. See infra notes 246-247 and accompanying
text.
196. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state anti-miscegenation laws).
197. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating malapportioned districts in state legislatures).
198. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law restricting use of contraceptives by
married couples).
199. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (expanding the right to appointed counsel in state criminal
proceedings).
200. E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (invalidating a state law excluding
women from jury service).
201. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a state law restricting flag
burning).
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
204. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'x 509 (1996);
Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REv. 619 (1994).
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Supreme Court to use Loving v. Virginia to invalidate the federal Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA") or the state laws that DOMA explicitly protects.
General common law, by contrast, could never be used in this manner. This
goes a long way toward alleviating the countermajoritarian difficulties that
afflict the theories of common-law constitutionalism; 2 5 with general com-
mon law, the Court's adventurism is directly constrained by the statutes and
treaties enacted by the national political processes. (These constraints in-
clude the Rules of Decision Act, which, depending on how broadly one
construes it, may foreclose the Court from deploying wrongly decided con-
stitutional precedents over state law in some of the "civil actions" that it
decides. 20 6)
Second, these general-law doctrines are not part of the Constitution or
any other "supreme" federal law. That means that Article VI imposes no
obligation on state judges to obey or follow the Supreme.Court's general-
law pronouncements, even though the general-law rubric allows the Su-
preme Court to reaffirm an erroneous constitutional precedent and use it to
displace state law. The Supreme Court's ruling, however, remains binding
on state courts in the realist, Holmesian bad-man sense: a state court that
defies the Supreme Court will likely face a swift reversal, and this threat of
reversal may suffice to keep state judges in line. State-court nonacquies-
cence will likely prove futile, even if constitutionally permissible. It also
means that general law cannot by itself supply a basis for "arising under"
jurisdiction in federal court; a litigant must be able to characterize his griev-
ances as nonfrivolous federal constitutional claims. They need not be
winning constitutional arguments, but they must be colorable enough to get
through the federal courthouse door; once there, supplemental jurisdiction
enables him to rely on the Supreme Court's general-law precedents.
20 7
Third, general common law cannot supply a remedy in federal habeas
corpus proceedings, as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) allows habeas relief for state
prisoners only when their custody "violat[es] the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." ' 8 But there is nothing anomalous about a re-
gime that carves out the Supreme Court's erroneous constitutional
pronouncements from enforcement in post-conviction proceedings, while
205. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 92 (2009)
(noting that under the theories of common-law constitutionalism, it is "not at all obvious why
judges should rely on precedent or tradition to trump the views of current legislatures").
206. See infra notes 216-229 and accompanying text.
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (extending the federal courts' supplemental jurisdic-
tion to the maximum extent authorized by Article HI); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that Article HI extends the federal courts' supplemental juris-
diction to all claims involving the same "common nucleus of operative fact"); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (authorizing the Supreme Court to review an entire state-court "judg-
ment[] or decree[]" whenever a litigant presents a federal-law claim); Jonathan F. Mitchell,
Reconsidering Murdock: State-Law Reversals as Constitutional Avoidance, 77 U. CMI. L.
REV. 1335, 1342-45 (2010) (noting that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 permits the Supreme
Court to review all issues decided in a final state supreme court ruling so long as the "judg-
ment[] or decree[]" presents at least one federal-law claim).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
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allowing the Court to use them when reversing state-court convictions on
direct review. Stone v. Powell °9 already precludes the Supreme Court from
granting habeas relief on exclusionary-rule claims, even as the Court con-
tinues to enforce the exclusionary rule on direct appeal, and textualist jurists
can simply extend the rule in Stone to other wrongly decided constitutional
precedents.210 In contrast to the federal habeas statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
more easily construed to support a cause of action for those asserting rights
secured by general-law doctrines, as it applies to persons deprived of
"rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
Even if one interprets the ambiguous word "laws" in § 1983 to extend only
to "supreme" federal laws,21' general common law can itself supply a cause
of action to vindicate rights that the Supreme Court has established212 -so
long as no provision of "supreme" federal law precludes it.
Fourth, common-law constitutionalists hold that the Supreme Court not
only may but should embrace judicial precedent over state law, and they
invoke Edmund Burke to construct theories of legitimacy and epistemology
to justify this practice.213 This account of stare decisis, by contrast, remains
agnostic on the normative question of when the Supreme Court should fol-
low wrongly decided constitutional precedents over state law; the answer
could very well be "never."214 The point is only that the text of the Suprema-
cy Clause gives the Supreme Court room to decide whether to apply
(nonsupreme) judicial precedent over (nonsupreme) state law as a rule of
decision, and a textualist can embrace a role for stare decisis in these types
of cases while still insisting that the Supreme Court follow the original
meaning of constitutional text whenever it purports to construe the docu-
ment.
By equating the Supreme Court's wrongly decided precedents with gen-
eral common law, rather than federal constitutional law, this account of stare
209. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (requiring federal habeas courts to reject exclusionary-rule
claims so long as the state courts provided an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the
claim, even if the state courts decided the claim incorrectly).
210. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that Stone should be extended to "bar claims on habeas that allege[] violations of the
prophylactic rule of Miranda v. Arizona"); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (arguing that
the rule in Stone should apply to all constitutional claims brought by convicted state prison-
ers).
211. See, e.g., Lewellen v. Metro. Gov't, 34 E3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Unless a
deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has occurred, § 1983 provides no
redress even if the plaintiff's common law rights have been violated and even if the remedies
available under state law are inadequate.").
212. See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49
U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 412 (1982) (noting that early twentieth-century federal courts freely
created private rights of actions by "exercising the common law powers recognized in Swift v.
Tyson," and that federal courts continued this practice post-Erie).
213. See Strauss, supra note 204, at 893-94; Merrill, supra note 204, at 515-23; Young,
supra note 204, at 686-715.
214. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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decisis poses a less serious threat to representative government than com-
mon-law constitutionalism, or the more robust versions of living
constitutionalism that encourage the justices to interpret the Constitution in
a manner that advances contested normative values. It is difficult to believe
that the Constitution gives unelected judges those types of powers when Ar-
ticle V does so much to prevent the enactment of new constitutional rules
that lack supermajoritarian support. But general common law can never be
used to change the Constitution's meaning, or trump an act of Congress or a
treaty. It simply substitutes judicial precedents for state law as the rules of
decisions in a limited subset of cases.
215
C. A Note on the Rules of Decision Act
Even though the text of the Supremacy Clause allows the Supreme
Court to apply judicial precedent rather than state law as rules of decision,
the Court must still comply with the Rules of Decision Act ("RDA"), which
provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply. '216 Earlier versions limited this
command to "trials at common law," but since 1948 the statute has extended
to "civil actions," which include suits seeking equitable relief but exclude
criminal prosecutions.
The broadest possible construction of the RDA would compel the Su-
preme Court to apply state law over judicial precedent in every civil
proceeding not governed by one of the "supreme" federal laws-the federal
Constitution, an act of Congress, or a treaty.2 7 Even on this view, the Su-
preme Court could still apply its questionable constitutional precedents as
general common law when reviewing federal and state criminal prosecu-
tions, but it would leave them powerless to apply those precedents over state
law in civil proceedings. This construction would also eradicate almost all
forms of federal common law in federal civil cases, except where an act of
Congress or constitutional provision delegates those common-law powers to
215. Professor Harrison has argued that the Supreme Court's norms of stare decisis (ra-
ther than the precedents themselves) qualify as general common law, and suggests that
Congress may therefore legislate rules of constitutional stare decisis that differ from those
deployed by the Supreme Court. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of
Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 531-43 (2001). But Congress cannot legislate a regime of stare
decisis that inverts the hierarchy of laws established in Article VI. A statute commanding the
Supreme Court to give binding precedential weight to Plessy or Seminole Tribe (or any other
precedent that nullifies a federal statute or upholds a state law against constitutional challenge)
will violate the Supremacy Clause if those precedents represent erroneous constitutional pro-
nouncements. Once the Court's stare decisis practices are derived from the text of the
Supremacy Clause, Congress has only a limited power to legislate the priority that should be
given to wrongly decided constitutional precedents.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
217. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761, 799 (1989).
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the courts. 218 State law, rather than judge-created doctrines, would be used to
fill any other gaps in the "supreme" federal law; federal courts could create
common law in civil cases only when the "supreme" federal law and state
law are incapable of providing an answer.
It is not clear that this approach represents the proper textualist interpre-
tation of the RDA. Some commentators, for example, insist that the phrase
"laws of the several states" refers not to the laws of individual states, but
rather to a nationwide common law that transcends state borders.219 But
even if we bracket this issue and assume that the RDA's mandate extends to
an individual state's laws, the requirement to apply the "laws of the several
states" is triggered only "in cases where they apply." This language seems to
envision categories of cases in which state law "applies," and others in
which it does not.220 Admiralty and interstate cases, for example, qualify as
"civil actions," yet the Supreme Court has long relied on its own common-
law precedents, at the expense of state law, in resolving those cases-even
though no federal statute, treaty, or constitutional provision conflicts with
state law in those situations.2 One might defend this practice by character-
izing admiralty and interstate cases as the types of "cases" in which state
law does not "apply"; instead, they are cases more appropriately resolved by
a uniform court-created common law rather than the varying laws of the
several states. This approach treats the RDA's "in cases where they apply"
caveat as delegating to the Supreme Court the power to decide whether state
law or court-created common law should "apply" as the rule of decision in
any particular "case. '22
2
218. See id. at 790-94.
219. See, e.g., WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF
1789, at 86 (1990) ("In the Judiciary Act the words 'respective' or 'respectively' are used to
individualize or particularize the reference, whereas 'several' is used to refer to a collection of
individuals or entities as a group"); id. at 140 ("The phrase, 'the laws of the several states,' in
[the RDA] does not mean that the national courts are to apply the law of a particular state ....
If this meaning had been intended, the word used almost certainly would have been 'respec-
tive' and not 'several.' "); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the
Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PE'P. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) ("[T]he instruction in [the
RDA] to apply 'the laws of the several states' directed courts not to the law of any individual
state, but rather to the law of all states-in other words, to federally developed common law.
The purpose was to ensure that American law, not British law, would apply in the federal
courts.").
220. Field, supra note 160; see also Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881,
887 (5th Cir. 2001) ("After all the Rules of Decision Act itself ends with the qualifying phrase
'in cases where [state laws] apply.'" (footnote omitted)).
221. See, e.g., David P Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess",
1960 Sup. CT. REV. 158; Field, supra note 160; supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
222. See Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895) ("Perhaps under the
final words of [the RDA], 'in cases where they apply,' the court may have a certain discretion
with respect to the enforcement of state statutes such as was exercised by this court in several
cases."); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1128,
1168 n.194 (1986) ("The ambiguous phrase 'in cases where they apply' surely can be read to
mean 'in cases in which there is no federal common law preempting state rules of deci-
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Neither of these approaches provides a completely satisfying interpreta-
tion of the RDA. The first seems to leave the "in cases where they apply"
caveat with no work to do, while the second treats the statute as a tautology,
a statutory directive to the federal courts to apply state law except in cases
where they choose to apply court-created common law instead. A third pos-
sible approach would interpret the RDA's "in cases where they apply"
caveat as preserving the common-law powers of federal courts that were
understood and accepted in 1948. When Congress re-enacted the RDA in
1948, the Supreme Court had long been applying judicial precedents over
state law in interstate controversies223 and admiralty cases,2 24 and by invok-
ing stare decisis in cases presenting constitutional challenges to state
laws. 225 By extending the RDA from "trials at common law" to "civil ac-
tions," the re-enacted RDA ratified the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in
Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 22 6 which extended Erie's holding to equity cas-
es.2 27 But by preserving the Act's limitation to "cases where [state laws]
apply," the statute left undisturbed the settled common-law powers that the
Supreme Court had asserted prior to 1948. On this view, the prerogative to
apply court-created common law over state law depends less on the Su-
preme Court's whim and more on the historical practices that pre-date the
RDA's 1948 re-enactment.
I do not attempt to offer a definitive construction of the RDA in this Ar-
ticle, an issue that commentators have debated for decades without
resolution. 2 8 But it is important to note, first, that the RDA is a "supreme"
law that the federal courts must obey. Second, the text of the RDA can be
construed to give courts latitude in deciding when state law "applies" and
when other bodies of law (such as general commercial law, customary inter-
national law, or Supreme Court precedent) should supply the rule of
decision, especially if those practices were established when Congress re-
enacted the RDA in 1948.229 Third, even the broadest possible construction
sion.' "); see also Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 816
(1989).
223. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
224. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
225. See, e.g., Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (invalidating the University
of Oklahoma Law School's racially exclusionary policies by relying exclusively on the prece-
dential force of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)).
226. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
227. See Revisor's Note at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (noting that "'Civil actions' was
substituted for 'trials at common law' to clarify the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act in
the light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such Act has been held to apply to suits in
equity").
228. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 16, at 370 ("No issue in the whole field of federal
jurisprudence has been more difficult than determining the meaning of this statute.").
229. Early court rulings interpreting the original Rules of Decision Act, which are rele-
vant only to the extent that they might provide evidence of the statute's meaning at the time of
enactment, construed the RDA to require the application of state law only in areas that they
deemed governed by "local" law, such as title to real property. These diversity courts retained
their prerogative to apply "general" law-such as the law merchant and the law of nations-in
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of the RDA will not foreclose the Supreme Court from applying a wrongly
decided constitutional precedent when reviewing federal and state criminal
prosecutions, so long as it does not conflict with a "supreme" federal statute
or treaty provision.
** *
Supreme Court justices must comply with the external legal constraints
in the ratified constitutional language, but they need not follow the self-
imposed constraints from their previous opinions. From this simple observa-
tion comes a theory of stare decisis that allows textualists to accommodate
constitutional precedents while remaining true to their textualist interpretive
commitments. On this view, the Supreme Court must always obey the two-
tiered hierarchy of laws established in Article VI: the Constitution, federal
statutes, and treaties are "supreme"; state laws and judicial precedents are
nonsupreme. But there is no obligation to follow Marbury's suggestion that
federal courts may never enforce an unconstitutional federal statute, or
Erie's suggestion that state law must always prevail over other sources of
nonsupreme law, such as judicial precedent. As canonical as those decisions
are, they are merely Supreme Court opinions and not part of the written
Constitution. And this fact enables textualists to invoke stare decisis when
upholding federal statutes against constitutional challenge or when sustain-
ing "constitutional" challenges to state laws-even if the relevant precedent
misconstrues the Constitution. It may seem paradoxical that this defense of
stare decisis scales back on two of the most famous precedents in Supreme
Court's history, but there is nothing objectionable about that from a textual-
ist standpoint.
The following chart illustrates this approach:
Invoking Constitutional Stare Decisis to:
Uphold Nullify
Permissible under Art VI: Violates Art. VI:
Act of Congress or Treaty expands congressional supremacy, if it causes an erroneous precedent to
shrinks domain of Marbury trump a federal statute or treaty
Violates Art. VI: Permissible under Art. VI:
State Law if an erroneous precedent causes expands general common law,
state law to trump Constitution shrinks domain of Erie
commercial disputes and other cases of national concern. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 160, at
1527-28 ("Federal courts usually felt obliged to comply with state law only in subject areas of
peculiarly local concern, such as title to real property."); id. at 1532 (noting that "[t]he
dividing line between general law and local law was unclear," and that federal courts "usually
followed general law when the subject matter was of national concern, as in commercial cas-
es"); id. at 1538-39 (cataloging the early nineteenth-century marine-insurance cases, and
noting that all fifty-three of them applied general common law rather than state law); see also
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (applying customary international law in a
case with "no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision" on
point); Coolidge v. Payson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 66 (1817) (applying the general law merchant,
rather than state law, to resolve a negotiable-instrument case).
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The next part will consider how textualist justices might implement this
theory of stare decisis in light of the institutional realities of judging.
III. STARE DECISIS AND DECISIONMAKING
Part II showed that the Supreme Court never violates the Supremacy
Clause if it invokes stare decisis to uphold a federal statute or treaty or inval-
idate a state law. The Supremacy Clause does, however, constrain a
textualist jurist's ability to use stare decisis when invalidating a federal stat-
ute or treaty, or rejecting a constitutional challenge to state law. A textualist
cannot nullify a constitutional act of Congress, or enforce an unconstitution-
al state law, simply by incanting an erroneous constitutional precedent; he
cannot invert the hierarchy of laws established in Article VI in the name of
promoting stability, reliance interests, or any of the policies that undergird
stare decisis.
But no judge is able to detect "correct" and "mistaken" constitutional
precedents with perfect accuracy. Every Supreme Court justice will encoun-
ter uncertainties in determining whether a precedent correctly interprets the
Constitution.23 ° And even when certain that a precedent is right or wrong, a
justice can be mistaken, even by reference to his own interpretive theories.23" '
This is especially true with textualist theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion, which confront serious epistemic challenges when the historical
evidence surrounding original meaning is conflicting or unclear. Part II as-
sumed away these problems; this Part will explore how a justice might
implement this theory of stare decisis in light of these institutional con-
straints.
32
All judges, whether textualists or pragmatists, will incur decision costs
and error costs when deciding constitutional cases; they can hope only to
230. See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the "correctness of Hans as an original matter"
presents a "complex" question).
231. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dillard ed., 2d ed. 1953) ("The spirit of
liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right[.]"); SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 139
(noting that judges may adopt decisionmaking strategies "out of an awareness of their own
limitations and their capacity for error"). Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
481-83 & nn.9-10 (2000) (relying on Joel Prentiss Bishop's criminal-law treatises to support
the claim that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, as originally understood, required that
any fact that increased the maximum allowable penalty was treated as an "element" of a
crime), and id. at 510-12 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same), with Jonathan E Mitchell, Appren-
di's Domain, 2006 Sup. CT. REV. 297, 329-42 (compiling nineteenth-century state-court
rulings that contradict the claims in Bishop's treatises).
232. See VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 1 ("The question in law is never 'How should this
text be interpreted?' The question is always 'What decision-procedures should particular insti-
tutions, with their particular capacities, use to interpret this text?' "); see also Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup.
CT. REV. 231, 255 ("What decision procedure should a nine-member body employ to reach
the best decisions they can over an array of cases highlighting experiential and political differ-
ences among the nine decisionmakers?").
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minimize and not eliminate these costs. Even textualists, who are generally
loath to subordinate the pursuit of legally correct answers to consequential-
ist considerations, will confront cases in which they remain uncertain even
after exhaustively researching the relevant case law and academic commen-
tary.233 Scholars who have devoted years of study to the Fourteenth
Amendment offer no fewer than four interpretations of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, all of which find plausible support in the relevant histor-
ical materials. 234 No jurist can hope to land on the "correct" interpretation of
this constitutional provision with any degree of confidence. Judges also face
time constraints and opportunity costs in pursuing the legally correct inter-
pretation of a constitutional provision. At some point the decision costs will
max out, and the judge must dispose of the case by resorting to heuristics or
tiebreakers. 235 Judges often use stare decisis as a tiebreaking mechanism in
these unavoidable situations; deference to the political branches serves as
another plausible candidate for this role.
2 36
All of these decisionmaking strategies entail some risk of error costs.
But the Supremacy Clause provides a richer model of error costs for textual-
ists who must choose tiebreaking mechanisms in cases of uncertainty. Once
we account for the Supremacy Clause constraints on constitutional stare
decisis, every case presents two distinct types of error costs. The first is
"constitutional-interpretation error," the risk that a justice will join an opin-
ion (or re-affirm a prior opinion) that misconstrues provisions in the
Constitution, as judged by his own interpretive theories. This risk exists
233. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Originalism's Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1295, 1328 (2008) (noting that originalism requires decision rules "for situations in which the
method 'runs out' and ends in uncertainty").
234. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 25, at 18-19 (arguing that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause forbids only race discrimination regarding the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 28 (1980) (characterizing the Privileg-
es or Immunities Clause as "a delegation to future constitutional decision makers to protect
certain rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in any specific
way gives directions for finding," and arguing that the privileges or immunities of citizens
should include "representation-reinforcing" rights that protect political minorities); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992)
(arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates many, though not all, of the
provisions in the Bill of Rights against the states); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileg-
es or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992) (characterizing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as primarily an anti-discrimination provision, and arguing that "[t]he main
point of the clause is to require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of
state citizenship-the same positive law rights of property, contract, and so forth-to all of its
citizens" (emphasis added)).
235. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAM-
INATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 101-02 (1991) ("A decision
procedure that aims to optimize in every case may be self-defeating, producing worse results
in the aggregate than a decision procedure with more modest ambitions.... [R]ules may at
times represent second-best solutions, optimal in reality even though suboptimal from the
perspective of an unattainable (in practice) ideal.").
236. See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv.
1269 (1997).
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whenever a judge purports to rule on the meaning of a constitutional provi-
sion. Even when the justices reject a constitutional challenge to a federal
statute or treaty, or sustain a constitutional challenge to state law, the Court's
opinion, or the judicial precedents on which the Court's opinion rely, may
announce (in a case of first impression) or perpetuate (in a case involving
stare decisis) a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution. The second type
of error costs is "Supremacy Clause error," the risk that an erroneous consti-
tutional interpretation will cause the Court's judgment to violate the
hierarchy of laws established in the Supremacy Clause. This risk is not pre-
sent when the justices uphold federal statutes or treaties, or subordinate state
laws to constitutional precedents, because those dispositions can always be
rationalized as rulings that expand the domain of either congressional su-
premacy or general common law. But the risk of Supremacy Clause error
will lurk whenever the justices sustain a constitutional challenge to a federal
statute or treaty, or reject a constitutional challenge to state law. Supremacy
Clause error compounds the constitutional-interpretation error, because it
means that one cannot concoct a constitutionally permissible rationale for
the Court's disposition. In these situations, the justices are not merely misin-
terpreting the Constitution in their written opinion; they are violating the
Supremacy Clause and entering judgment for the wrong party.
Now consider a jurist who remains unsure whether Article I of the Con-
stitution allows Congress to enact legislation abrogating a state's sovereign
immunity. He considers the issue a toss-up, with risks of constitutional-
interpretation error no matter which way he votes. Many justices in this
situation would allow stare decisis to resolve this issue. But stare decisis is
the wrong tiebreaker to use in these types of cases; the better tiebreaker is
the presumption of constitutionality that the Supreme Court (sporadically)
applies when litigants bring constitutional challenges to acts of Congress.
The reason is simple: if Hans v. Louisiana237 and Seminole Tribe v. Flori-
da238 correctly interpreted the Constitution, then the Supremacy Clause
permits (but does not require) the justices to nullify federal statutes that
abrogate state sovereign immunity. But if Hans or Seminole Tribe is wrong,
then applying stare decisis will cause the justices to subordinate a "su-
preme" federal statute to a nonsupreme judicial precedent, violating the
hierarchy established in Article VI. Upholding the (perhaps unconstitution-
al) federal statute avoids any risk of Supremacy Clause error, while
enforcing the (perhaps unconstitutional) judicial precedents will cause the
Court to violate the Supremacy Clause if the judicial precedents adopted
mistaken constitutional interpretations. If the judge views the risk of consti-
tutional-interpretation error as a wash, then ties should go to the federal
statute, not the Supreme Court's precedent that may or may not represent a
proper interpretation of the "supreme" Constitution.
A similar decisionmaking framework applies when the justices consider
constitutional challenges to state laws. Imagine a justice in 1954 who is in
237. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
238. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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equipoise over whether the Equal Protection Clause permits segregated pub-
lic schools, and pondering whether to use Plessy's endorsement of "separate
but equal" as the tiebreaker. Here, too, stare decisis is the wrong tiebreaker
to apply, because it would present the risk of elevating an unconstitutional
state law over the "supreme" federal constitution. The same problem would
be presented by a tiebreaker that resolves all doubts in favor of the state
law's constitutionality (a "presumption of constitutionality" for state laws).
In these situations, where the constitutional arguments attacking and defend-
ing a state law lead to stalemate, the justices should err on the side of the
litigant challenging the state law; any tiebreaking procedure that tilts the
Court's disposition in favor of upholding a possibly unconstitutional state
law will bias the Court's disposition toward potential Supremacy Clause
error, without reducing the likelihood of constitutional-interpretation error.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This part will explore the implications of this textualist theory of stare
decisis. Section IV.A analyzes the Supreme Court's stare decisis jurispru-
dence, which, for the most part, has complied with this textualist
construction of the Supremacy Clause. Section IV.B considers the preceden-
tial weight of Supreme Court decisions that overrule constitutional
precedents. Finally, Section IV.C explores the role of stare decisis when liti-
gants challenge the constitutionality of executive-branch actions.
A. The Supreme Court's Case Law
The Supremacy Clause enables textualist jurists to rationalize many
(though not all) of the Supreme Court's prominent treatments of constitu-
tional precedent. The decisions that use stare decisis to reject Commerce
Clause challenges to congressional legislation, 239 apply the Bill of Rights to
the states, 240 or invalidate racial classifications in state laws241' all comply
with the hierarchy of laws established in Article VI. All of these rulings can
be recast as decisions that either expand the domain of congressional su-
premacy or subordinate state law to general common law.
Even when the justices invoke precedent to nullify a federal statute, or
reject a constitutional challenge to state law, they often make clear that they
regard the disputed precedent as a correct interpretation of the Constitution.
In Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,
242
where the Rehnquist Court invalidated a federal statute that subjected states
to suit before administrative tribunals, the five-justice majority described
Hans v. Louisiana and other relevant precedents as "well-reasoned,"243 indi-
239. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
240. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
241. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
242. 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
243. Fed. Mar Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 754.
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cating that Hans's persuasiveness, rather than its mere status as precedent,
was driving the Court's analysis. Of course, the justices may still have em-
braced a mistaken interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in that case,
but they did not apply stare decisis in an unconstitutional manner.
Some of the Court's rulings invoke precedent in a manner that violates
Article VI's hierarchy of laws, but only a few. The most obvious example
is Dickerson v. United States," where the justices invalidated an act of
Congress solely on the stare decisis effects of Miranda v. Arizona . 4 5 Alt-
hough the Supremacy Clause permits the justices to use Miranda and
other judicial precedents as rules of decision when reviewing state-court
convictions, they cannot subordinate a "supreme" federal statute to a prior
Supreme Court decision, unless the statute violates the Constitution itself.
The Dickerson Court did not (and could not) claim that 18 U.S.C. § 3501
contradicted any provision in the Constitution, so it violated the Suprema-
cy Clause by exalting its Miranda decision over an act of Congress. The
same goes for Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,24 6 where the justices
nixed a federal affirmative-action statute by relying solely on the prece-
dential effects of earlier-decided court rulings. The language of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the
federal government, and rather than attempt to demonstrate how some oth-
er constitutional provision might impose an equality-of-treatment
obligation on federal officials, the majority opinion was content to rely
solely on the existence of judicial precedents asserting that identical con-
stitutional standards should govern federal and state racial
classifications. 247 That analysis is far too cavalier. Any decision to invali-
date an act of Congress requires some demonstration of how the federal
statute violates actual provisions in the written Constitution; talismanic
invocations of controversial judicial precedents won't suffice.
The paramount implication is that the Supremacy Clause limits the
weight that stare decisis can receive, but only in cases where the justices
invoke it to invalidate a federal statute, or uphold a state statute against
federal constitutional challenge. This makes the Court's seemingly contra-
dictory rulings in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.248 and Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC49 perfectly logical. Croson had invalidated a
municipality's quota system for minority-owned businesses, while Metro
Broadcasting upheld a hard-to-distinguish minority-preference policy that
Congress had imposed on the FCC. The Court distinguished Croson by
invoking the congressional legislation that authorized the FCC's policy: "It
244. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
245. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (2000) ("Whether or not we would agree with Miran-
da's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.").
246. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
247. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 212-31.
248. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
249. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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is of overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's minority owner-
ship programs have been specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by
Congress. 2 50 Indeed so, but this significance depends not on the Court's
questionable empirical assertion that Congress is more trustworthy than
the states.25 Rather, it depends on the constitutional limits that the Su-
premacy Clause imposes on stare decisis. Once Congress enacts a federal
statute, the weight normally given to judicial precedent qua precedent
melts away, and the Constitution does not allow the Court to nullify con-
gressional legislation merely for conflicting with Croson or any other
precedent of the Court. No such constraints on stare decisis exist when the
justices invalidate state affirmative-action policies.
Likewise for the Supreme Court's difficult-to-reconcile decisions in
Stenberg v. Carhart,25 2 which invalidated a state partial-birth abortion ban,
and Gonzales v. Carhart,253 which upheld a federal statute banning the
same procedure. Supporters of legalized abortion complained loudly that
the Gonzales Court gave short shrift to stare decisis considerations, 254 after
the Stenberg Court had nixed the state law by relying solely on the prece-
dential effects of Roe v. Wade15' and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.25 6 Here, too, the Supremacy Clause offers an ex-
planation for the difference in approaches. State law is nonsupreme;
therefore the Constitution allows the justices to subordinate state law to
judicial precedent. An act of Congress, by contrast, is the supreme law of
the land whenever it comports with the Constitution, and the justices can-
not trump an otherwise constitutional federal statute by invoking a
nonsupreme judicial precedent. A textualist justice must respect congres-
sional legislation unless he deems it repugnant to a proper interpretation of
the Constitution. The Supremacy Clause would not have allowed any of
the justices in the Gonzales majority to ditch a federal statute by relying
on a precedent that they deemed erroneous.
Perhaps by happenstance, the seemingly opportunistic use of precedent
by the Supreme Court's liberal justices fits almost hand-in-glove with this
Supremacy Clause-inspired theory of stare decisis. The Court's liberals
refuse to give precedential weight to Seminole Tribe v. Florida2 57 (which
250. Metro. Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 563.
251. Id. (declaring that "deference was appropriate in light of Congress' institutional
competence as the National Legislature").
252. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
253. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
254. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Foreword: Consti-
tutions and Capabilities: "Perception" Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 84
(2007); Geoffrey R. Stone, Essay, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Consti-
tutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2008).
255. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
256. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
257. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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invalidated an act of Congress) 258 and Bowers v. Hardwick259 (which re-
jected a federal constitutional challenge to a state law). 260 Yet they continue
to confer the mantle of stare decisis on Roe v. Wade (which invalidated a
state law)26' and the many decisions expanding congressional powers.262
Legal-realist observers would chalk up these divergences to ideological
preference and leave it at that.263 Justice Souter has been especially criti-
cized for his refusal to accord precedential weight to the Court's decisions
invalidating federal statutes that abrogate state sovereign immunity and re-
jecting Establishment Clause challenges to state laws;26 4 his intransigence
on these matters seems especially rich given that he co-authored the sym-
phony to constitutional stare decisis in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.
But the text of the Supremacy Clause provides a rationalization for all of
these actions, without surrendering to the legal-realist mantra that treats ju-
dicial doctrines as nothing but politics in disguise. The text of the
Supremacy Clause does not allow a justice to elevate an erroneous constitu-
tional precedent over an act of Congress, or an unconstitutional state law
over the federal Constitution. And the written Constitution does not permit
the policy considerations of stare decisis to invert this hierarchy of laws. But
in cases where the justices uphold federal statutes, or invalidate state laws,
the Constitution allows stare decisis to control the Court's disposition. So
there is nothing unprincipled about Justice Souter co-authoring the Casey
opinion while digging in his heels when the topic of conversation changes to
state sovereign immunity. The Supremacy Clause prohibits a justice from
invalidating congressional legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity
unless it actually conflicts with the Eleventh Amendment (or some other
constitutional provision). If Justice Souter remains unconvinced that any
such conflict exists, then he must dissent, no matter how many times the
Rehnquist Court reaffirms Seminole Tribe. From this perspective, Justice
Souter deserves praise, not criticism, for his obstinate refusal to yield to
stare decisis in the sovereign-immunity cases. As do the dissenters in United
258. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 788 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (promising "continued dissent" from the Rehnquist Court's sovereign-
immunity jurisprudence); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as
controlling precedent.").
259. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
260. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
261. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46.
262. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20 (2005).
263. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Comment: Five to Four:
Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 177, 190-91 (2002) (criticiz-
ing Justice Souter for opportunistically invoking stare decisis, and contrasting his eagerness to
embrace precedent in Casey with his determination to overrule the Rehnquist Court's sover-
eign-immunity and Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
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States v. Booker,2 65 who refused to allow stare decisis considerations to con-
trol a constitutional challenge to the federal sentencing statute--even though
an indistinguishable precedent, decided only one year earlier, had already
doomed the federal sentencing guidelines.
266
Of course, it is also unsurprising that the Court's liberal wing would be
loath to use stare decisis to invalidate federal statutes and more eager to in-
voke it to nix state laws. Liberal jurists (as a general matter) favor broad
judicial deference to acts of Congress, yet they are far more inclined to nul-
lify state laws as unconstitutional. So one cannot entirely exclude the
attitudinal political scientists' explanations for their voting patterns. But
whether they intended this or not, the liberal justices' approach to stare deci-
sis maps neatly on to Article VI's hierarchy of laws. Federal statutes are the
supreme law of the land whenever they comply with the Constitution, and
nothing written in a prior Supreme Court opinion can alter that hierarchy.
State laws lack this exalted status under Article VI. Of course, liberal jurists
also tend to be pragmatists rather than textualists, so they may not have
much motivation to embrace this Supremacy Clause-inspired theory of stare
decisis. But it does enable them to counter accusations that they are behav-
ing opportunistically or lawlessly.
B. The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Decisions
Overturning Precedents
The Supremacy Clause also has implications for the precedential value
of Supreme Court rulings that overturn constitutional precedents. It is too
simplistic to assume that Brown v. Board of Education's decision to jettison
Plessy v. Ferguson has any bearing on whether to retain Roe v. Wade, or that
Planned Parenthood v. Casey's glorification of constitutional stare decisis
has any relevance in deciding whether to reaffirm Bowers v. Hardwick. In
some of these cases, the Supremacy Clause constrains the justices' ability to
invoke stare decisis. In others, the Constitution gives the justices latitude to
use their precedents as rules of decision. It is crucial to distinguish these
cases; the justices' treatment of stare decisis in one type of case has little to
say for the use of precedent in the other.
Consider Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
2 67
where the Court held that stare decisis compelled it to reaffirm its controver-
sial ruling in Roe v. Wade, even as it acknowledged that Roe had
265. See 543 U.S. 220, 326-31 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (refusing to accept the
binding authority of the Court's precedents when considering a constitutional challenge to the
federal sentencing statute).
266. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (prohibiting judges from imposing
sentences beyond the maximum sentence allowed based on facts found by the jury or admitted
by the defendant); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) ("As the dissenting opin-
ions in Blakely recognized, there is no distinction of constitutional significance between the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in that case.").
267. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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"engendered opposition" and "disapproval. 268 The Casey opinion labored
mightily to distinguish Brown v. Board of Education269 as well as its "switch
in time" of 1937, each of which had overruled major constitutional prece-
dents in response to sustained public criticism and opposition. 270 But the
easy way to distinguish those episodes from the situation in Casey is to note
that the Supremacy Clause prohibits the justices from relying on stare deci-
sis considerations once they conclude that a state law conflicts with a
federal constitutional provision (as in Brown), or that a federal statute com-
ports with the Constitution (as in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.27 1).
When the Brown Court determined that separate-but-equal regimes violate
the Equal Protection Clause, it could not rely on Plessy v. Ferguson to
justify a decision elevating an unconstitutional state law over the supreme
federal constitution-at least not without violating the hierarchy of laws
established in Article VI.272 And once the justices in Jones & Laughlin con-
cluded that the National Labor Relations Act fell within Congress's Article I
commerce powers, they could not subordinate this "supreme" act of Con-
gress to their nonsupreme precedents that had narrowly construed
Congress's Article I powers, no matter what "reliance interests" may have
been at stake. 273 But the decisions to depart from stare decisis in Brown or
Jones & Laughlin have no precedential value for situations such as Casey,
where the Supremacy Clause gives the justices the freedom to choose
whether to apply an erroneous constitutional precedent as a rule of decision.
Because Casey involved a challenge to state abortion regulations, the justic-
es could subordinate these state laws to general common law without
violating the Supremacy Clause. That means that even if Roe had misinter-
preted the Constitution by treating abortion as a federal constitutional right,
the Casey ruling could still apply the Roe regime as a rule of decision by
reconstituting it as general common law.2 74 This approach enables the Casey
Court to distinguish its treatment of stare decisis from not only Brown and
Jones & Laughlin, but also the post-Casey ruling in Lawrence v. Texas 275 -
and it rests on a distinction that transcends ideological preferences. The joint
opinion's effort in Casey runs the risk of making stare decisis seem like a
ratchet that turns only in leftward directions, an impression that is only
268. Casey, 505 at 855, 860-61.
269. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
270. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64.
271. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
272. See supra Section II.B.3.
273. See supra Section II.B.2.
274. Of course, the Casey Court would still need to provide a persuasive justification for
its decision to apply judicial precedents as general common law over the abortion policies
enacted by a state's elected representatives. The point is only that Article VI has nothing to say
on that fiercely debated question.
275. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (refusing to adhere to stare decisis after concluding that a state
criminal prohibition on homosexual sex conflicted with the federal Constitution).
October 20111]
Michigan Law Review
amplified by the Court's alacrity in overruling Bowers v. Hardwick eleven
years later.
The same goes for efforts to use Casey as a precedent in cases where the
Supremacy Clause limits the use of stare decisis. Casey's approach to stare
decisis works in only a limited subset of cases: those in which the Court's
disposition upholds an act of Congress or subordinates state law to judicial
doctrine. It does not license the justices to invoke their controversial prece-
dents to invalidate federal legislation (as in Dickerson or Seminole Tribe) or
reject federal constitutional challenges to state laws. In those situations, the
Constitution compels the justices to follow the hierarchy in the Supremacy
Clause rather than stare decisis.
C. Stare Decisis in Cases Challenging Executive-Branch Action
What about stare decisis in cases that challenge the legality of executive-
branch action? A number of famous and controversial Supreme Court
precedents address the constitutionality of unilateral presidential decisions,
including United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,276 United States v.
Belmont,2 77 United States v. Pink,2 78 and Dames & Moore v. Regan.2 79 Does
the Supremacy Clause impose any constraints on the justices' ability (or the
ability of executive-branch lawyers) to apply these cases as authoritative
precedents when litigants challenge the executive branch?
Presidential actions and decrees are not the "supreme Law of the Land";
they are neither treaties nor are they "[1]aws of the United States" made in
accordance with Article I, Section 7. Sometimes, of course, an act of Con-
gress may authorize or command the executive branch to act. But decisions
that implement or interpret an act of Congress do not become "supreme"
law themselves; at most they can establish binding interpretations of the
federal statute's meaning. They are no more "supreme" than the judicial
precedents that interpret federal statutes or constitutional provisions.
The Supremacy Clause prohibits textualists from invoking wrongly de-
cided precedents to elevate a nonsupreme law over a supreme one. There are
two ways this could happen in executive-power cases. First, stare decisis
might lead someone to elevate a mere presidential action or decree (non-
supreme) over either a federal statute or constitutional command (supreme).
This means that textualist jurists cannot subordinate an act of Congress to an
executive-branch policy merely by invoking Curtiss-Wright and treating it
276. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (upholding the president's authority to prohibit sales of
arms to other countries, and declaring that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations").
277. 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (enforcing an executive agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union and using it to displace state law).
278. See 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (following Belmont by enforcing an executive agreement
and using it to displace state law).
279. 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (enforcing an executive agreement that settled legal claims of
U.S. nationals against the government of Iran and relegated those claims to an international
tribunal).
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as binding precedent;280 the supremacy clause permits this outcome only
when the Constitution, properly interpreted, disables Congress from enact-
ing the relevant federal statute. Second, stare decisis might cause someone
to elevate a wrongly decided judicial precedent (nonsupreme) over a consti-
tutional act of Congress (supreme). If Congress enacts legislation attempting
to shape the country's foreign policy, a textualist cannot nullify those stat-
utes by simplistically invoking Curtiss-Wright's mantra that declares the
president "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations."2"1 He must
instead find that the statutes contradict the written Constitution. There is no
problem with relying on Curtiss-Wright if it correctly interprets the Consti-
tution, but a textualist cannot simply assume the correctness of Curtiss-
Wright and then use it to displace a supreme act of Congress.
The Supreme Court may, however, invoke stare decisis in cases where
executive-branch actions conflict with state law. Executive orders and ex-
ecutive agreements, like state law, are nonsupreme, and the Supremacy
Clause fails to establish any hierarchy among these laws. The text of the
Constitution therefore leaves the justices with discretion to decide whether
to apply state law or executive-branch policies as rules of decision, and stare
decisis considerations may inform their choices. The justices, for example,
chose to use the president's executive agreements rather than state law as
rules of decisions in United States v. Belmont2"2 and United States v. Pink,83
even though executive agreements cannot qualify as "supreme" law under
Article VI. Then they relied on Belmont and Pink to justify their decisions to
follow the president's executive orders and executive-branch policies, rather
than state law, in cases such Dames & Moore v. Regan,284 and American
Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi.2 85 In Medellin v. Texas,2 86 by contrast, the
justices chose to follow state law rather than allow a presidential "memo-
randum" to supply the rule of decision. The Constitution permits stare
decisis to play a prominent role in the evolution of this executive-power
280. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVI-
TIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 6-10 (2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (relying on
Curtiss-Wright and other judicial precedents to justify the Bush Administration's disregard of
federal statutory provisions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
281. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).
282. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327.
283. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-31.
284. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679 ("[T]here has also been a longstanding practice of
settling [claims of American nationals against foreign countries] by executive agreement with-
out the advice and consent of the Senate.").
285. 539 U.S. 396, 415-17 (2003) (invoking Belmont and Pink to support the proposi-
tions that "executive agreements are fit to preempt state law" and that a "claim of preemption
[may] rest on asserted interference with the foreign policy those agreements embody").
286. 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) ("The Executive's narrow and strictly limited authority to
settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement cannot stretch so far as
to support the current Presidential Memorandum.").
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jurisprudence, so long as the cases involve a choice between two non-
supreme sources of law.
This approach also gives added significance to Justice Jackson's canoni-
cal framework for judging the legality of executive-branch action. Jackson's
famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer287 estab-
lished three categories for judging the legality of presidential actions.
"When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum ... ."2 When he acts "in absence
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority," he can rely on "his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which [the presi-
dent] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain." '289 And when he "takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb."29 Jackson acknowledged that this was "a somewhat over-simplified
grouping, ' but his approach to executive power has proved influential.2 92
The constitutionality of stare decisis in executive-power disputes will
depend on which Youngstown category applies. In Jackson's first category,
where a "supreme" federal statute authorizes the president's actions, the
justices may freely rely on stare decisis to uphold the president's decisions.
The Supremacy Clause always permits the justices to enforce an act of Con-
gress as the supreme law of the land, and a decision upholding a
congressionally authorized executive action can always be re-rationalized as
a ruling that permits federal statutes to have the final word on constitutional
meaning. This is no different from allowing Wickard to control the outcome
in Raich; even if Wickard is wrong, the Supremacy Clause still permits the
justices to respect the finality of Congress's mistaken constitutional pro-
nouncements. The justices may not, however, use wrongly decided judicial
precedents to invalidate presidential actions in Jackson's first category; that
287. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
288. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
290. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
291. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
292. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito endorsed the Jackson framework dur-
ing their confirmation hearings as the starting point from which to evaluate executive-power
claims. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 152 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., J., D.C. Circuit); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of Samuel A. Alito, Jr to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 403 (2006) (statement of Samuel
A. Alito, Jr., J., 3d Circuit). Other jurists and commentators have heaped praise on Jackson's
opinion. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Speaking in the Name of the Law: Some Reflections on
Professional Responsibility and Judicial Accountability, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 447, 462
(2003) (describing Jackson's Youngstown concurrence as "the greatest opinion in our 215-year
history of constitutional opinions"); William H. Rehnquist, Robert H. Jackson: A Perspective
Twenty-Five Years Later, 44 ALB. L. REv. 533, 539 (1980) (calling the Youngstown concur-
rence "a 'state paper' of the same order as the best of the Federalist Papers, or of John
Marshall's opinions for the Court").
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would subordinate a "supreme" act of Congress to a "nonsupreme" court
decision. For these dispositions, the justices may invoke judicial precedents
only if the federal statute on which the president relies actually conflicts
with the Constitution.
In Jackson's third category, where the president acts in the teeth of a
federal statutory prohibition, the Supremacy Clause inverts this role for stare
decisis. Here, a court decision invalidating the executive-branch action will
enforce the federal statute. But the Supremacy Clause permits the Supreme
Court to enforce even unconstitutional congressional legislation, so the Con-
stitution presents no obstacle if the justices uphold the statutory prohibition
by giving stare decisis considerations controlling weight-regardless of
whether the relevant judicial precedents were correctly decided. The justices
cannot, however, uphold presidential actions in Jackson's third category
merely by invoking a wrongly decided judicial precedent. That would allow
both a nonsupreme judicial precedent and a nonsupreme executive action to
trump a "supreme" (and constitutional) act of Congress. So the supremacy
clause limits the use of stare decisis in those situations.
Finally, in Jackson's second category-the "zone of twilight"-the ex-
ecutive action is neither blessed nor prohibited by a "supreme" act of
Congress. But it might conflict with a state law or with a federal constitu-
tional provision. In cases where a nonsupreme executive action conflicts
with a nonsupreme state law, the Supremacy Clause is silent on the rules of
priority, and nothing in the written Constitution precludes the justices from
resorting to stare decisis to break the deadlock. Stare decisis cannot, howev-
er, be used to exalt a nonsupreme executive action over a "supreme" federal
constitutional command. Consider, for example, the many precedents
holding provisions in the Bill of Rights inapplicable to executive actions
taken against aliens outside of U.S. territory.293 A justice who deems these
decisions mistaken cannot decide to uphold an unconstitutional executive-
branch action outside our borders in the name of promoting "stability,"
"reliance interests," or other stare decisis-related policy considerations. On
the other hand, a justice may rely on erroneous judicial precedents to invali-
date an executive-branch action in Jackson's second category. This would
simply pit two nonsupreme laws against each other, and there is nothing
wrong with using stare decisis as a tiebreaker in those situations.
293. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) ("[T]he
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against arbi-
trary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the provision was intended
to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States
territory."); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) (rejecting the notion that "the
Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are
located and whatever their offenses"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937)





For stare decisis to obtain universal acceptance, it must rest on rationales
that can satisfy both pragmatists and textualists. Fortunately, the words of
the written Constitution can accommodate many (though not all) applica-
tions of constitutional stare decisis. Textualist attacks on constitutional stare
decisis go off track by begging two questions that the written Constitution
simply does not answer. The first is whether, and to what extent, the Consti-
tution obligates the Supreme Court to disregard unconstitutional
congressional enactments. The second involves the rules of priority between
state law and other sources of nonsupreme law, including judicial prece-
dents, executive-branch actions, general common law, and customary inter-
international law. Marbury and Erie purport to answer these two questions,
but textualism requires the Supreme Court to observe only the external legal
constraints imposed by the written Constitution, not the self-imposed con-
straints created by previous justices.
Peeling away the barnacles of interpretive gloss shows that the written
Constitution permits the Supreme Court to use wrongly decided precedents
as rules of decision whenever it upholds a federal statute or treaty, or invali-
dates a state law. But the Supremacy Clause does limit the justices' ability
to invoke stare decisis in rulings that nullify federal statutes, or that reject
constitutional challenges to state laws. This asymmetric theory of constitu-
tional stare decisis may create some tension with the opinions in Marbury
and Erie. But it does not contravene the written word of the Constitution.
And that is all that needs to be shown to establish its constitutionality.
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